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This thesis provides an analysis of the effects of recent historical
events on the future of French security policy. The end of the Cold
War division of Europe, the rebirth of Germany, the growing
pressures for major defense cuts, the calls for France to review its
nuclear doctrine, abandon its independent policies and rejoin NATO's
integrated military structure, and finally, the lessons of the recent
Gulf War, are issues that threaten to divide France in a way that has
not occurred in several decades. The fundamental question for the
decade of the 1990s is how to, or perhaps whether to, preserve the
legacy of national independence and grandeur handed down by
former President Charles de Gaulle. The thesis concludes that the
Gaullist myth of grandeur and independence can no longer be
sustained. French security must now be achieved by strengthening
ties with NATO, and building a stronger West European defense
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the year 1989, France celebrated the bicentennial of its
revolution. 1991 marks the 33nd birthday of the drafting of the
constitution of the Fifth Republic. By French standards this is a
remarkable record since the average life of the country's 15
constitutions or charters since the year 1791 has been 13 years and
four months. Ironically, the French have spent the last several years
celebrating their history and the man most associated with the last
50 years of it, Charles de Gaulle, precisely at the time when a new
mood of uncertainty and debate over the future of the French
political identity appears to be at its height.
The end of the Cold War division of Europe, the rebirth of
Germany, the growing pressures for major defense cuts, the
increasing calls for France to review its nuclear doctrine, and the
urging by allies for France to abandon its independent policies and
rejoin NATO's integrated military structure, are issues that threaten
to divide France in a way that has not occurred in several decades.
Many Frenchmen now believe the choice is one of resignation at
being one nation among many in a German-led Europe, or continuing
to pursue Gaullist-type foreign and defense policies which are
becoming increasing difficult, if not soon impossible, politically and
financially, to sustain.
The fundamental question for the decade of the 1990s is how
to, or perhaps even whether to, preserve the legacy of national
independence and grandeur handed down by De Gaulle that is so
. 1
clearly associated with the Fifth Republic's security policy. In one
U.S. defense analyst's view:
France's autonomous defense posture and, since 1966,
special status as a non-integrated member of NATO were
predicated upon the continuing existence of favorable
international circumstances, an expanding domestic consensus
on security policy, and a robust economy and defense
industrial base. Each of those assumptions is being challenged,
to various degrees, by an international situation in flux, eroding
public support for defense spending, and adverse budgetary
trends. 1
The strong and widespread support that France has typically enjoyed
for its foreign and defense policies can no longer be assumed.
Indeed, the domestic challenge to those policies appears to be
increasing dramatically and as a result, the portent of a significant
reorientation of policy is becoming clear.
As President Francois Mitterrand enters his eleventh year in
power, it has become obvious that France faces unexpected and
unwanted changes abroad. Rather than relying on power to protect
its place in the international arena, France must, as during the
immediate postwar period, rely on the talents, skills and diplomatic
prowess of its leader. With four years left until his final term in
office expires, Mitterrand appears eager to make his mark in history
as the man who eroded the Gaullist legacy of independence and
1 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," Draft paper for presentation at the conference on Force Mobilization,
the Revolutions of 1989, and the Future of European Security, National Defense University, Washington,
D.C., 19-21 June 1990, 1-2.
French nationalism and established a new European identity for his
country, principally in the vanguard of the European community. 2
During the De Gaulle era (1958-1969), France became the
symbol of determined raison d'tat, independence and grandeur,
reluctant to embrace any supranational movement on the
assumption that it would seriously compromise France's national
identity. Yet, in the past decade, and particularly in the last three
years, France has actively promoted itself as an ardent supporter of
European initiatives. Mitterrand has functioned as the lead driver in
a move to promote a more unified European political and economic
identity to both enhance Europe's international leverage and, in
particular, to counter growing German economic, and hence political,
power.
The decisive French turn toward Europe has been reinforced by
the 1989 democratic revolution in Eastern Europe, which is widely
perceived as enhancing German power even more, and which has
evidently destroyed any lingering French pretensions at politically
dominating Europe. Indeed, the French could watch Chancellor Kohl's
steadfast pursuit of a greater Germany with only a clear sense of
helplessness and lack of direction.
Compounding the blow to common French assertions of France
being a world class power, French budgetary difficulties are making
at least some controversial defense cuts inevitable and there are
even discussions in French defense circles that elements of the
2 William Drozdiak, "Mitterrand, Kohl Stepping Up Pace Without Britain," The Washington Post . 3
November 1990, A 14.
prestigious nuclear force de frappe may be allowed to become
obsolete. Even the French are being forced to acknowledge that the
political usefulness of nuclear weapons and hence the essence of
France's claim to great power status, is diminishing along with East-
West tensions.
Perhaps as a result of the pace of the profound changes in
Europe, Mitterrand's reactions have seemed hesitant and uncertain.
This has led some critics to portray him as a cynic, quick to abandon
policies and principles. 3 Perhaps a more accurate explanation,
however, is simply that Mitterrand is still searching for France's
proper role in a rapidly changing Europe.
With German reunification, France has been required to
relinquish its special responsibilities in Germany as one of the four
victorious powers of the Second World War. Chancellor Kohl took the
lead, establishing firm control over the unification process, informing,
rather than consulting the Allies of events that were occurring.
Ignoring his critics' advice, Mitterrand has refused to issue
declarations to the Germans. Instead, he has attempted to convince
the Germans of the virtues of European unity.
Mitterrand's next task will be to convince his own nation. One
Pulitzer journalist has repeatedly described De Gaulle as "a political
psychiatrist, ministering to a nation that was to suffer traumas of
defeat, betrayal and loss."4 In the next several years, Mitterrand will
need to play the role of the political psychiatrist, ministering to a
3 Jim Hoagland, "Mitterrand in the Briar Patch," The Washington Post . 3 May 1990, A25.
4 Jim Hoagland, "France: Le Jour De Gloire Est Passe," The Washington Post . 22 July 1990, C4.
nation suffering from reduced national influence, independence and
military power. The Gaullist vision of France as a nation destined to
glory as a result of its leading role in world affairs is rapidly fading
as Europe, indeed the world, centers its attention on Germany and
the democratization of Eastern Europe.
Unfortunately, precisely at the time when strong leadership
and direction are most needed, Mitterrand has been unable to
provide a clear vision of where and how France will fit into the new
order. The central problem appears to lie in an uncertainty of the
French government in knowing exactly what it wants. President De
Gaulle accurately prophesied in 1965 the conditions that would have
to exist for German reunification to occur; however, he could not
have predicted the benign role France would play were this to
happen:
Assuredly, the success of so vast and difficult an enterprise
(German unification) implies many conditions. Russia must
evolve in such a way as no longer to conceive its future in
totalitarian constraint imposed at home and abroad, but in
progress accomplished in common by men and free peoples. Its
satellites must play their role in a renewed Europe. It must be
recognized, above all, by Germany, that the settlement of which
would be the object would necessarily include its frontiers and
armaments in agreement with all its neighbors, East and West.
The six states that, let us hope, are in the process of establishing
the West European economic community must succeed in
organizing themselves in the political and defense domain in
order to make possible a new equilibrium of our continent.
Europe, the mother of modern civilization, must be established
from the Atlantic to the Urals in concord and cooperation to
develop its immense resources and to play, together with its
daughter, America, the appropriate role in the progress of two
billion people who badly need it. What a role Germany could
play in this worldwide ambition of the rejuvenated Old
Continent! 5
The French were not prepared for the magnitude of the
changes that German reunification and the end of the postwar
division of Europe would have on international security
arrangements. Because European security in the postwar period has
depended on the partition of Germany and Europe, developments
since 1989 have had profound effects on all European nations'
security policies, but particularly that of France. French security
policy has critically depended on the super structures of the Cold
War - Germany laden with U.S. troops and nuclear and conventional
weapons and the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Europe.
However, U.S. troops and weapons have begun to leave
Germany, with large-scale withdrawals imminent. The future role
and structure of NATO are clearly uncertain and, as a corollary, so
are the ties between the U.S. and Europe. The future of the Soviet
Union is perhaps the least predicable dimension of the new European
political landscape; East and West have solemnly agreed that the Cold
War is over, but Moscow's huge military might remains largely
intact, to pose at least a potential danger.
Finally, the war in the Persian Gulf has allowed many questions
concerning Germany's new role in the international arena, and
particularly the European arena, to surface. After widespread fears
surfaced shortly after reunification over possible rising German
militarism, Germany's "benign" response to the Gulf War prompted
fears concerning Germany's commitment to NATO, the European
5 Steven Philip Kramer, "France Faces the New Europe," Current History . November 1990, 365.
Community (EC) and other European and Western institutions. The
French are becoming increasingly concerned over what appears to be
a German preference for denuclearization and neutrality - an
occurrence which would level a certain blow to the premise of French
security policy.
This thesis examines each of these areas with a view toward
defining how recent events have shaken the foundations of French
security policy, demanding the revision of its fundamental tenets.
The areas examined include the following:
1) A review of French security policy since the Second World
War and the pervasive impact of De Gaulle's legacy;
2) The effects of Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the relative
decline of Soviet power on French security policy;
3) The impact of German reunification and the end of the post-
war division of Europe on French economic and security
policies; and
4) The implications of French cooperation with its Western
Allies in the recent Gulf War.
Finally, this thesis concludes with an estimation of the direction
French security policy appears to be headed - a continuation of the
current course, which is becoming increasingly unsustainable, or an
acknowledgement that France's security is dependent upon greater
cooperation with NATO and her European allies.
II. FRENCH SECURITY POLICY SINCE
THE SECOND WORLD WAR
A. BACKGROUND
In 1815, after the defeat of Napoleon, France was still
considered a Great Power. The label did not change even long after
the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, although
for the first time in her history, she has become greatly dependent
on her allies for security. France gained her main objective in World
War I, the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine, but for the price of 1.4
million dead or over 10 per cent of the male population.6 Again,
French status as a Great Power remained intact.
When the French surrendered to the German military invasion
in 1940, it was widely agreed that France would never again be a
Great Power. This was a conclusion vehemently opposed by the
Resistance and General Charles de Gaulle's Free French Movement.
De Gaulle's 18 June 1940 broadcast from London, announcing the
founding of the Free French Resistance and declaring that France had
lost a battle, but not the war, is an event characterized by great
festivity in Paris each year. The following is an apt interpretation of
the significance of this event to the French nation:
This broadcast was the beginning of de Gaulle's long career as a
political psychiatrist, ministering to a nation that was to suffer
traumas of defeat, betrayal and loss. From June 18, 1940 until
his death in 1969, de Gaulle fashioned a political identity for the
" David S. Yost. "The French Way of War," Essay presented at the Conference of the International Studies
Association, Philadelphia, 18-21 March 1981,5.
8
French that they donned and wore like a winter greatcoat
against the harsh winds of history. 7
France's populat self-perception as a Great Power is owed
largely to De Gaulle's convincing arguments. He insisted that France
had not lost the Second World War but had won it as much as had
the Russians, British and Americans. Hence, he insisted France was
to be accorded all the perquisites due the other Great Powers, most
notably, an occupation zone in Germany and Berlin. It followed that
France would share in the responsibility for the ultimate disposition
of the German question, and would take a seat on the United Nations
Security Council. To underscore France's proper rank, De Gaulle
accelerated the country's nuclear weapons program and embarked
on a much more autonomous role for France in both the European
arena and NATO. De Gaulle acknowledged in 1961: "France proposes
to recover the exercise of its full sovereignty - it is intolerable for a
great state that its destiny be left to the decisions and actions of
another state." 8
De Gaulle believed that the only way to recover full
sovereignty and credibly protect the national "sanctuary" was by
having and controlling strategic nuclear weapons as the basis of the
nation's deterrence doctrine. The concept of "two battles" was
formulated and outlined by De Gaulle as early as 1963. It would
entail a "forward battle" in West Germany in which French
conventional forces might play a reserve role for Allied forces, if it
7 Jim Hoagland, "Revive la France!" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition . 30 July-5 August
1990, 24.
8 De Gaulle as cited in Yost, "The French Way of War," 8.
was deemed to be in French interests. But this role would be clearly
subordinated to the second, decisive battle when French resolve to
resort to her strategic nuclear arsenal, if necessary, would be made
clear to the enemy.9 This concept was articulated further in 1964
with the introduction of the idea of a nuclear "warning shot." 10 The
latter remains a part of French deterrence doctrine to the present
time.
Since all of France's current strategic nuclear forces were
planned during General de Gaulle's presidency, his strategic concepts
have become the foundation of a doctrine he announced in 1964. It
has since been refined, but remains largely in effect to the present
time. De Gaulle announced:
In 1966, we will have enough Mirage IVs and tanker aircraft to
be able to strike at once, at a distance of several thousand
kilometers, with weapons whose total yield will surpass that of
150 Hiroshima bombs . . . The path of deterrence is henceforth
open to us, for the act of attacking France would be equivalent
for any aggressor to undergoing frightful destruction himself.
Of course, the megatons that we could launch would not equal in
number those that Americans and Russians are able to unleash.
But, once reaching a certain nuclear capability and as far as
one's own direct defense is concerned, the proportion of
respective means has no absolute value. In fact, since a man
and a country can die but once, deterrence exists as soon as one
can mortally wound the potential aggressor and is fully
resolved to do so, and he is well convinced of it. 11
9 David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part I: Capabilities and Doctrine,
Adelphi Papers No. 194 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), 5.
10 ibid.
1
* De Gaulle as cited in David S. Yost, "French Nuclear Targeting," Strategic Nuclear Targeting , eds.
Desmond Bell and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), 129.
10
1. The Fourquet Doctrine
In 1967, General Charles Ailleret, Chief of Staff of the
French Armed Forces, presented the doctrine of "Tous Azimuths" - an
abstract concept for targeting French nuclear weapons in all
directions of the horizon. A month before De Gaulle resigned in
1969, General Michel Fourquet, Ailleret's successor, presented a new
military doctrine which clearly identified the Soviet Union as the
potential enemy. This doctrine, which remains largely valid today,
saw tactical nuclear weapons as useful for "testing" the adversary's
intentions and demonstrating France's will to resist, and if necessary,
escalate to strategic nuclear strikes. 12 Fourquet's "two battles"
doctrine saw "overlapping possibilities between potential combat in
coordination with allies and the combat that would support France's
national deterrent maneuver." 13 Naturally, France's potential
participation in this forward battle or any other would be
subordinated to the requirements of the national deterrent
maneuver.
According to Fourquet, France's participation in the
"forward battle" would not take place in the framework of NATO's
"flexible response". This would prove ineffective for deterrence and
very costly in terms of conventional forces since the assets allocated
for this mission would be incapable of conducting a defensive action
of any lengthy duration. Fourquet believed what would most likely
occur would be an autonomous air-ground offensive engagement of




French forces forward but in close proximity to the borders and
centered on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a massive, single-
salvo strike against an enemy who had broken through NATO's
forward defenses. 14 Although the concept of the two battles was
never explicitly formulated, nor officially sanctioned, the ambiguous
wording of the French White Paper on Defense published in 1972
made apparent the concept of the "independent deterrent maneuver"
- independent from the forward battle that would be fought by the
NATO allies.
2. Withdrawal from NATO's Integrated Military
Structure
France's withdrawal from the NATO integrated military
structure was the natural corollary to such premises. After De
Gaulle's return to power in 1958 and the establishment of the Fifth
Republic, De Gaulle's views of a "European Europe" became evident.
Four basic themes were apparent: a Europe of independent states
with no supranational authority; a Europe independent of the United
States; a Europe in which France is the dominant power in terms of
foreign policy; and a Europe open to the East. 15 Collectively, this
would be De Gaulle's ideal of a "European Europe" or a "Europe from
the Atlantic to the Urals" which included the Soviet Union but not the
U.S.
14 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Between the Rhine and the Elbe: France and the Conventional Defense of
Central Europe," Current News . No. 1695, 2 March 1988, 474.
15 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe," in The New
International Actors: The U.N, and the E.E.C. . eds. Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett
(London: Macmillan, 1970), 191.
12
De Gaulle was greatly suspicious of offers of assistance to
French security from any other nation, but particularly from the
United States. He often claimed that France had not received the
allied assistance it desperately needed in the initial stages of both
world wars and therefore was quickly invaded by Germany. Those
feelings of vulnerability were heightened in 1956 when the United
States refused to aid France in the Suez crisis. Moreover, France
criticized as inadequate the support it had received in the war in
Indo-China and at the battle of Dien-Bien-Phu, and in the Algerian
War of Independence between 1954 and 1962. Lastly, some authors
have cited De Gaulle and Roosevelt's dislike for each other as perhaps
the root of De Gaulle's "notorious anti-Americanism". 16
In 1966, De Gaulle announced France's pursuit of
independence through the possession of strategic nuclear forces
capable of deterring any threat to her vital interests. He believed
France's independence would be complete if withdrawal from an
entangling NATO structure made her obligations to her allies less
automatic. 17 However, after withdrawal, France could continue to
benefit from the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella and NATO's efforts to
deter the Soviets and neutralize German power.
A related issue was also cited by De Gaulle as a reason for
France's withdrawal. De Gaulle firmly disagreed with the U.S.
doctrine of flexible response and cited it as likely to undermine the
credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee. His rationale was
16 ibid., 190.
17 Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture," 5.
13
twofold. First, he maintained that the essence of credibility was the
threat of massive and immediate nuclear retaliation - not gradual
escalation. Next, De Gaulle believed a doctrine of flexible response
would tempt the superpowers to limit any hostilities to the European
homeland while keeping their own as "sanctuaries" - areas free from
nuclear strikes. He also feared the United States would most likely
postpone any nuclear employment until Europe had been devastated
by conventional warfare, when perhaps an earlier use of nuclear
weapons might have prevented war altogether.
One final aspect of De Gaulle's strategy was the removal
of all significant Allied installations from French territory. This
allowed France to maximize her independence by choosing to engage
in an option of non-belligerency in any conflict she deemed contrary
to her interests. Thus began the basis of the deterrence doctrine that
remains in effect to the present: strategic nuclear forces can only
credibly protect the national "sanctuary" of the government
controlling them.
3. The Non-belligerency Option and French
Cooperation with NATO
Many political and military authorities for years have
asserted that if NATO were attacked by the Warsaw Pact, the French
would certainly and immediately join NATO forces in defense of
Western Europe. However, any automatic commitment of French
forces to NATO or, even more so, any automatic subordination of
French forces to NATO command in times of war, has been clearly
and repeatedly rejected by the French since their withdrawal from
NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. Their declared option
14
of non-belligerency was adopted to keep French forces that remain
essentially dedicated to the execution of the national deterrent
maneuver firmly in the control of the French President.
General Jeannou Lacaze, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces, explained France's cooperation policy with NATO in
September 1981:
In order to preserve the government's liberty of action
and to safeguard French interests in the Alliance, the
cooperation policy will continue to repose on the three
following principles:
- cooperation only involves conventional forces, and therefore
excludes all nuclear force employment planning;
- no automatic commitment of French forces, which excludes in
particular France receiving any peacetime responsibility for
ground, sea or air zones and participating in what is called the
'forward battle';
- in the case of a commitment at NATO's side, French forces
will remain grouped under national command and in directions
or zones covering national territory. 18
Inherent in these principles are two other French positions: no
significant allied units or operational bases are allowed on French
soil; and no automatic NATO access to French air space, logistic and
other infrastructure assets, such as airfields, ports, railways,
petroleum pipelines, communications and transportation
installations. In 1967, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, judged the loss of French territory and airspace
as more disadvantageous to the Alliance than the loss of French
forces. 19
18 ibid., 10.
19 Lemnitzer as cited in Yost, "France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe," 59.
15
The degree of French adherence to the above principles
has become less evident since De Gaulle's presidential term. Under
both former French President Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand, the
trend has been toward greater likelihood of French participation in
any European conflict. The attempt has been to reaffirm France's
commitments to her allies, while not exactly withdrawing the option
of non-belligerence. Seemingly, any attempt at even the slightest
reintegration into NATO or perceived abandonment of France's non-
belligerency option would be interpreted as betraying the Gaullist
legacy.
B. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
De Gaulle argued on numerous occasions that no foreign policy
can be genuinely independent unless supported by appropriate
military strength. 20 In 1975, Giscard d'Estaing reaffirmed De Gaulle's
ambitions by claiming, "France is and must remain the third nuclear
power in the world and it goes without saying that we reject any
idea of a ceiling on the French nuclear force." 21
French strategists stress the value of the concept of
"proportional deterrence," a concept whose meaning appears to be
kept deliberately vague and imprecise in order to enable a surprise
reaction. 22 According to De Gaulle's definition of this concept, a more
powerful adversary can be deterred effectively, nuclear as well as
20 David S. Yost, "French Defense Budgeting: Executive Dominance and Resource Constraints," Orbis .
Fall 1979, 579.
21 Giscard d'Estaing as cited in Yost, "French Defense Budgeting," 584..
22 For a review of various definitions of this concept see Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture," 15.
16
conventional, by the sheer disproportion between the damage he
might suffer from nuclear retaliation, compared with the potential
gains he can hope to achieve by attacking the smaller nuclear
country. 23 Thus, in the French view, this doctrine lends credibility to
their relatively small, independent nuclear force by rendering war as
an unacceptable and pointless exercise.
The French deterrence concept is founded on the need for a
strictly "sufficient" nuclear arsenal. Deterrence for the French means
not winning wars but preventing them. Mitterrand described it as,
"keeping forces in a state of 'sufficiency' - in terms of quantity,
quality, performance - so as to be capable of inflicting damage on the
aggressor that would be at least equivalent to what he would stand
to gain." 24
The nuclear employment scenario would begin with the
release of "pre-strategic" forces (previously termed "tactical
weapons"), which are not intended to function as an extension of
conventional weapons. They are delivered in a single strike and
have enormous significance because they are considered the final
"warning shot" before the strategic nuclear offensive begins. The
balance between the nuclear and conventional forces is vital:
conventional, pre-strategic nuclear and strategic nuclear forces all
support and guarantee the security of one another. 25 Despite
23 Robert E. Osgood and Henning Wegener, "Deterrence: The Western Approach," Based on a study
conducted by the Secretary General of the United Nations, April 1985 - March 1986, 7.
24 Speech of M. Francois Mitterrand, "France's Defence," drafted at the Institute of Higher National
Defence Studies, 1 1 October 1988, as cited in Speeches and Statements . Sp. St/LON/98/88.
25 Carol Reed, "Peace through deterrence - The French Armed Forces," Defence No. 2/1990, 1 10.
17
changes in leadership, French officials have consistently upheld the
legitimacy of nuclear deterrence as the means of preventing war in
France. Nuclear weapons are further viewed as the key to
maintaining France's rank, independence and international status.
Not surprising then, France stands out as the Western country with
the strongest public consensus in support of nuclear deterrence.26
C. FRENCH CONVENTIONAL FORCES
French conventional forces were designed for the purpose of
fighting one basic contingency: a short intense conflict, probably in
conjunction with tactical (pre-strategic) nuclear strikes. 27 As a
result, nuclear forces were emphasized and given budget priority at
the expense of conventional forces from 1960 until 1976 when
Giscard d'Estaing requested several significant adjustments and
modifications to priorities. Prior to 1976, delays, cutbacks,
cancellations, and enormous cost-overruns were normal patterns in
conventional equipment procurement. After the 1976 emphasis on
conventional capabilities, the conventional forces were generally
considered better prepared for their mission. However, preliminary
results of French studies conducted on the performance of the French
troops in the Persian Gulf war indicate that the troops were ill-
26 David S. Yost, "The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence," draft paper, (photocopy), April 1990, 6.
27 Yost, "France and Conventional Defense," 28.
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prepared for war as a result of inadequate hardware, logistics,
intelligence, and training. 28
A major result of a reorganization of the army in 1983 was the
establishment of a new army command in the form of a highly
specialized military unit, the Force d'Action Rapide (FAR). The FAR is
a 53,000 men command oriented primarily towards rapid
intervention in Central Europe, as the forward echelon of the First
French Army, and overseas. Participation in the territorial defense
of France is a secondary mission. The creation of the FAR has been
viewed as evidence of recent French willingness to diversify military
options for responding to a central European contingency by
developing a more varied and capable conventional force. 29 The
creation of the FAR and a pledge by the French President to consult
with the German Chancellor prior to the employment of French pre-
strategic nuclear weapons on German territory, time and
circumstances permitting, are visible manifestations of diplomatic
initiatives made in an effort to enhance France's national security
and status within the Alliance. 30 This move clearly indicates a trend
toward increased involvement in the common defense of Western
Europe, mainly defense of Germany, and the need for, and move
toward, a more active French role in NATO.
28 Alan Riding, "France Concedes Its Faults In War," The New York Times . 8 May 1991, A7; Andrew
Borowiec, "France Shocked Into Revamping Its Armed Forces," Washington Times
. 30 April 1991, 8.
29 Yost, "The French Way of War," 9.
30 Palmer, "Between the Rhine and the Elbe," 473.
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Initial reports of the FAR's performance in the recent Gulf War
have fueled further speculation that the force may increase its
participation in allied training exercises. France was able to send
only one third of the FAR to Saudi Arabia and initial reports indicate
that the unit experienced problems coordinating with other allied
forces. 31 This has led some observers to speculate that now France
will most likely seek closer ties to the Alliance.32
D. FRENCH SECURITY POLICY IN THE 1990'S
The events of 1989 proved to be a turning point in history of a
magnitude that could not have been anticipated. In 1979, one author
correctly predicted the upset of long-standing French assumptions
that events in Europe have caused: "Only the reunification of
Germany, whether neutralized or not, could in the short term shake
the (current) feeling of continental security (that the French
enjoy)." 33 Not only do the French have to contend with the
reunification of Germany, but they must also come to terms with the
collapse of Communist authority in Eastern Europe, the prospective
withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region, and the imminent large-
scale reductions in the U.S. military and nuclear presence in Europe.
Faced in addition, are unprecedented pressures to reduce defense
spending, to participate more fully in arms control initiatives, to
review their nuclear doctrine and strategic force employment, and
31 Borowiec, "France Shocked Into Revamping," 9.
32 ibid.
33 Yost, "The French Way of War," 9.
20
now unexpectedly, to review the adequacy of their conventional
forces. Discussions in French defense circles of late indicate nearly
everything is shrouded in uncertainty.
1. The Impact of Recent Events in Europe
Many authorities see the security question in Europe as
inherently dependent on the long-term effects of German unity.
Many further this idea by claiming that the future of NATO, the
European Community, and the Western European Union are mainly
dependent on what Germany desires and that France's influence in
these areas is decreasing proportionally as Germany's influence
increases. The official French view has always been one of clear
support for German reunification with Germany entitled to self-
determination and full sovereignty. However, this view is clarified in
that a united Germany's defense must not be secured to the
detriment of other European countries. The French believe that the
legitimate interests of all the other countries involved, including the
Soviet Union, must be taken into account.34 It is quite clear,
however, that France's response to German reunification is an
attempt to contain the ever-growing German power, and speed up
the implementation of the European economic, monetary and political
union, within the framework of the EC, in order to ensure Germany
remains firmly tied to Europe.
German reunification has created other problems for
France as well. The bulk of the pre-strategic forces, which would be
34 Speech of M. Roland Dumas, Ministre DT5tat, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, before the Senate,
27 June 1990, as cited in Speeches and Statements . Sp.St/LON/92/90.
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used to provide the final warning of France's will to implement a
major nuclear strike on the aggressor, consist of 32 Pluton SSM
launchers. This system is scheduled for replacement by the Hades
SSM in 1992. The Hades is a semi-ballistic missile with greater
flexibility and improved firing rate, accuracy, and range (from 120
km for Pluton to nearly 500 km). 35
However, the popularity of the Hades appears to be in
fast decline. The missile is clearly unable to reach the Soviet Union,
and the Germans, on whose eastern territory the missile would most
likely fall, have become more and more vocal in urging its
abandonment. Moreover, in conjunction with arms control
negotiations, NATO's decision not to replace the Lance and to phase
out all nuclear artillery has further increased pressure to stop the
weapon's development.
The French, on the other hand, cite several reasons for
remaining committed to its deployment. Conceivably it would give
the President greater flexibility in his choice of nuclear options for
the final warning shot. 36 It could also become an ideal bargaining
chip in a new round of disarmament negotiations. However, many
French officials simply argue that, as a weapon of deterrence, the
Hades enhances the overall stability and security of Europe. This line
of reasoning was argued by the former Minister of Defense, Jean-
Pierre Chevenement: "Our weapons are not made to be used; they
35 Reed, "Peace through deterrence," 111.
36 Jolyon Howorth, "France since the Berlin Wall: defense and diplomacy," The World Today , vol. 46 No.
7, July 1990, 127.
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are deterrent weapons, they give credibility to deterrence which is
the only concept that is not just in France's but also in Europe's
interest: our goal is not to win a war but, as Francois Mitterrand has
said, to prevent it." 37
France's reluctance to abandon any weapons
development or modernization programs is a symptom of larger
French uncertainties concerning the situation in Europe.
Chevenement denounced the "complacent optimism" of those who
believe that disarmament initiatives will stabilize the East-West
relationship: "The position of France in Europe will depend, now
more than ever, on its independent defense posture." 38 According to
Chevenement, the Soviet Union will remain the only military
superpower in Europe for at least the foreseeable future. 39 French
officials believe that the military presence of the U.S. in Europe will
most likely dramatically decrease, adding to the current instability in
Europe. Faced with German reunification, U.S. force reductions in
Europe, and an unstable European political and economic situation in
general, the French feel they cannot afford to lose any of their
military capability, lest they lose their rank, independence, and
security.40
37 Interview with M. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, former French Minister of Defence, published in Per
Spiegel
. 8 March 1990, as cited in Speeches and Statements . Sp.St/LON/49/90.
38 Chevenement as cited in Alexandra Schwartzbrod, "Ebbing Eastern Threat Gnaws at France's




Furthermore, although the East is viewed as a continuing
threat, at least in the foreseeable future, it is not the sole threat.
Outside Europe some Frenchmen see powers emerging that "perhaps
will not exercise prudence which flows from historical experience."41
Indeed, there is a growing perception in France that "the threat" now
comes from the South rather than the East. An opinion poll in May
1989 revealed that only 20 per cent of the respondents felt the
Soviet Union was a threat, whereas 37 per cent believed the threat to
be Iran and 39 per cent the Arab World in general.42 As a result, a
new defense doctrine currently being drafted by the French Ministry
of Defense, in essence calls for a return to the "Tous Azimuths"
Doctrine - the all-directional defense policy.43 Not only will this
policy contend with worldwide threats, as opposed to threats simply
from the East, but is also perhaps seen as the best way to justify
France's rising defense budget.
2. Defense Spending in the 1990's
While the United States, Britain and Germany cut their
defense spending, France was the only major power to increase its
defense expenditure in 1990 - an increase of 3.8 per cent over the
previous year.44 Moreover, the government maintained full
spending on France's nuclear programs in 1990, allocating 23 percent
41 ibid.
42 Howorth, "France since the Berlin Wall," 128 and 130.
43 Schwartzbrod, "Ebbing Eastern Threat," 30.
44
"A pivotal power in Europe," Jane's Defense Weekly . 23 June 1990, 1246.
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of its total defense budget to the Force de Frappe, while cutting
spending on many conventional arms systems.45 Although there had
been some pressure within the government for defense cuts, it was
only in 1991 that the French government, for the first time in recent
history, faced serious domestic pressure to cut the 1991-92 military
budget in response to the changing world situation and the
increasing inability of France to fund the missions of its formidable
military might lest it risk compromising the health of its economy.
There are also strong indications, as reflected in recent
public-opinion polls, that the traditional domestic consensus on
military spending priorities and defense issues is beginning to break
up. Indeed, the debate has centered on such political issues as
France's status as one of Western Europe's strongest military powers
and its complex relationship with Germany.46 In the words of one
author, France must begin to reconcile the "political and diplomatic
costs of conducting a highly visible foreign policy at a time of
growing discrepancy between means and aims, speeches and reality,
the nation's ambitions and the nation's wealth."47
Indicative of this debate, France is said to be moving
toward abandoning upgrades to one of the three branches of its
nuclear strike force. The leg of the triad that would be neglected is
the 18 land-based ballistic missiles located in southeast France on
45 ibid.
46 Alan Riding, "The French Seek Their Own Peace Dividend'," The New York Times . 15 July 1990, 5.
47 Dominique Moisi, "French Foreign Policy: The Challenge of Adaptation," Foreign Affairs . Fall 1988,
152.
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the Plateau d' Albion.48 The missiles, which were slated for
replacement by the S-4 system, will evidently be allowed to become
obsolete over the next five to ten years. The move would free an
estimated 33 billion francs for modernizing the French nuclear
submarine fleet and developing the long-range air-launched nuclear
missile (ASLP), indicating France will rely mainly on submarines and
aircraft in the future.49
Overall, the government's response to the debate over
defense spending priorities has been a reorganization of priorities
and some minor conventional arms cuts. In reality, this amounts to a
slow-down in the growth rate of expenditure and a trimming or
spreading out of procurement programs, rather than cutting them.
Recently France has only reluctantly begun discussions to cut
military personnel as well, in contrast to the eagerness of other
European governments and the U.S. to do so. The "Armees 2000"
reorganization plan, unveiled in June 1989 by Chevenement, will,
however, save declining defense resources by rationalizing command
arrangements and consolidating missions and functions on a joint
services basis, when possible.50
3. French Participation in Arms Control
A closely related issue concerns French participation in
arms control negotiations. Under the Fifth Republic, the French have
48
"France Might Abandon One of Its Nuclear Arms," The Wall Street Journal . 16 October 1990, A23.
49
"French may wind down S-3 missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly . 27 October 1990, 793.
50 Palmer, "France," 8.
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viewed arms control with suspicion; a matter solely construed by the
superpowers as a means of preserving their own status and power in
view of the emergence of other independent nuclear powers. This
suspicion has persisted to the present and can be seen in the French
argument that, while there may be a conventional European balance,
there is not a nuclear one - a statement obviously inspired by the
French desire to avoid limitations and controls over their own
nuclear deterrent. 5
1
The French recall four essential elements that must be
met before their participation in arms control negotiations will occur:
1) asymmetric reductions of the superpower strategic arsenals that
will result in a quantitative balance or parity : 2) stability which will
guarantee that this new configuration of forces renders it impossible
to launch surprise attacks or major offensives; 3) sufficiency in terms
of the impossibility of one state to possess more than a specific
percentage of the armed forces in Europe; and 4) transparency which
will be secured by an information and verification system,
confidence-building measures and other initiatives.52 Several years
ago, the fulfillment of these conditions appeared near-impossible,
however, today they appear somewhat less contentious.
Prior to 1978, France's "empty chair" policy concerning
arms control was clearly inhibiting its opportunity to shape East-
5 1 Pierre Hassner, "The View from Paris," in Eroding Empire - Western Relations with Eastern Europe ,
ed. Lincoln Gordon (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 223.
52 Among other sources see the Speech of M. Roland Dumas, Ministre d'Etat, French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, before the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies, 6 February 1990, as cited in Speeches and
Statements . Sp.St/LON/32/90.
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West relations and the resulting force postures.53 Further isolation
from arms control negotiations was even being viewed as
disadvantageous and risky. Thus, in 1978 President Giscard
d'Estaing made several proposals at the United Nations which
clarified the fact that the French leadership had decided to become
involved, and hence influence, the arms control process in a manner
deemed constructive for long-term French security interests.54
4. Bilateral and Multilateral Defense Cooperation
The rational behind scrapping the "empty chair" policy
also produced incentives to pursue bilateral and multilateral
approaches to West European defense cooperation. This was recently
reinforced by developments that could erode the essential conditions
of France's security policy - credible U.S. nuclear guarantees to
Europe; and Germany, solidly anchored to NATO and the EC. Since
the Fifth Republic, France has had a preference for multiple
bilateralism over multilateralism, mainly because bilateral relations
are more conducive to flexibility and a chance for France to play the
leading role, whereas multilateral ones tend to reinforce bloc
solidarity and possible U.S. hegemony. In the future, France will,
most likely, increase its pursuit of bilateral and multilateral defense
cooperations efforts with emphasis on the first.
The most encouraging of France's bilateral defense
cooperation efforts have concerned Germany. The achievements in
53 For a discussion of France's "empty chair" policy see Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture, Part II," 35.
54 David S. Yost, "French Security Policy at a Crossroads," draft manuscript, December 1989, 22.
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Franco-German cooperation since the mid 1980's include improved
French capabilities for potential participation in the forward battle
such as the creation of the FAR and a revamped program of
exercises, an unprecedented pledge by Mitterrand to consult the
Chancellor prior to employment of the French pre-strategic weapons,
the creation of a Defense and Security Council, and the establishment
of a combined motorized infantry brigade.55 In spite of these
accomplishments, the French are becoming increasingly concerned
about the long-term prospects for Franco-German cooperation given
the increase in anti-nuclear sentiment in West Germany. This
concern has led to public pledges that were previously unthinkable:
"If West Germany became the victim of aggression, the engagement
of France would be immediate and without reserve," Prime Minister
Jacques Chirac announced in January 1988.56
In the past several years, defense cooperation efforts
with Britain have been equally encouraging. Of paramount
importance was a French agreement to activate the British line of
communication across northern France in peacetime for purposes of
exercising the movement of Germany-bound reinforcements and
supplies. 57 Cooperation has not only included logistics and
reinforcement planning but has recently expanded to include air
defense and out-of-area operations. Combined training between
British and French air forces and tanker aircraft exchanges are other
55 Palmer, "France," 25.
5(> Harry Anderson, "The New French Connection," Newsweek . 1 February 1988, 34.
57 Palmer, "France," 32.
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new dimensions. However, this expansion in conventional defense
cooperation has not been matched to date by comparable progress in
the nuclear arena, although an extensive amount of bilateral
consultation on the subject is occurring. Both countries have
acknowledged that significant areas of overlap in their nuclear
doctrines exist.58 The changing European situation combined with
the decreasing availability of defense expenditures may soon make
nuclear cooperation between the two countries mandatory. Recent
agreements allowing for reciprocal port visits by their respective
nuclear ballistic missile submarines and interconnection of the
Syracuse 2 and Skynet 4 satellite communications networks are a
good beginning.59
Bilateral cooperation with the United States has been a
slow but steady progression, indicative of France's increasingly
pragmatic approach to military relations with the U.S. and NATO.
The most visible progress has been in the field of maritime
operations. Other progress has been in the areas of training and
logistics. 60
E. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES
In view of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the
corresponding reorientation of the role of NATO, France has been





more in line with NATO's; this would eliminate a major blockade in
the road to France's return to NATO's integrated military structure.
However, although the French have been participating to a much
greater extent than is commonly known, particularly in the realm of
bilateral and multilateral exercises, any foreseeable return to NATO's
integrated military structure is not very likely. Additionally, as long
as NATO retains its present command structure, France will view it
as a U.S. -dominated framework limiting the freedom of action of its
members, and France will maintain its essentially anti-reintegration
stance.
Though official language retains the declaration of France's
membership in such a structure as inconsistent with its
independence and autonomy of action, France has ceased to play
Europe against the alliance and has accepted NATO's indispensability
to German security. Indeed, France has been one of NATO's most
outspoken proponents since the collapse of the communist
governments in Eastern Europe mainly because it views NATO as the
necessary framework for keeping the U.S. firmly bound to Europe.
French officials deem the commitment of the U.S. to the defense of
Europe as indispensable against the ever-present military might of
the Soviet Union. Although not publicly acknowledged, some officials
view the U.S. presence in Europe as a natural counter-weight to the
future military might of the now united Germany as well.
However, the French do not view a certain withdrawal of
American troops from European soil as necessarily bad, since it could
provide the opening for Europeans to take their own destiny in hand,
an opportunity France has long sought. The ideal institutions for
31
European military and political cooperation in the French view would
be the WEU and political union in the EC. To that end, France has
played the leading role in both the revitalization of the WEU and the
launching of an initiative for political union in the EC.
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III. THE EFFECTS OF GLASNOST, PERESTROIKA, AND
GORBACHEVS "NEW POLITICAL THINKING" ON FRENCH
SECURITY POLICY
In the relatively short period of time since Mikhail Gorbachev
became General Secretary of the Soviet Union, many of the long-
standing tenets of Soviet security policy have been re-examined.
More often than not, the new ideas being articulated are doctrinally
and ideologically revolutionary and could potentially lead to the
greatest changes ever undertaken in Soviet military policy. Indeed,
glasnost, perestroika and this "new political thinking" on security
served as the catalyst necessary to upset the balance of power
inherent in the post-war international order.
When President Gorbachev repudiated the expansionist
Brezhnev Doctrine and elevated the issues of disarmament and
detente to a high position on the international agenda, no European
country paid more attention than France. As the only other country
on the European continent to possess and control its own nuclear
weapons, France stands to lose much in terms of its perceived rank
and independence if arms control negotiations strip it of any
significant numbers of its nuclear armament. In fact, more so than
any other country in the world, France has based her defense on the
possession of a national nuclear armament, and therefore has come
to view arms control as more of a threat than a hope.
It is not surprising then that France remains the least pro-
Gorbachev country in Europe. Although not immune to Gorbachev's
appeal, the French seem to have continued trust and a feeling of
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security in the old Cold War order. Yet as a result of French
skepticism of the permanence or long-term impact of Gorbachev's
"new political thinking", France could stand to be cut off from any
emerging detente or have little say in defining the structure of a new
European security order.
The problem for France is how to reconcile its historical
suspicion of arms control and disarmament with the desire to not
disassociate or isolate itself from any newly emerging partnerships
and lose any leverage it may have with allies, and, above all,
compromise its own diplomatic or strategic independence. In the
French view, if the Soviet Union breaks up, Russia will remain the
single largest military power in Europe, a power that necessarily
must be somehow balanced. How to balance this great, and possibly
still unfriendly, military power and, equally important, how to
prevent a Russian-German entente, is clearly a problem that is high
on the French security agenda.
A. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF FRENCH-SOVIET
RELATIONS
In the past one hundred years, two great forces have largely
influenced French policy toward Russia, and then, the Soviet Union:
the ideology of its regime; and its position as a candidate for
continental hegemony. Even in the nineteenth century, before the
communist revolution, the ideological element was present. One
French observer, the Marquis de Custine, described Russia as a
mysterious, closed, alien, and despotic society and a threat to the
peace of Europe; as Custine put it, "the slave on his knees dreams of
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world empire." 61 Additionally, given the geographical situation,
France is neither directly dominated nor directly threatened by the
Soviet Union (there are no common borders, no conflicts of territory,
nor are there any conflicts of minorities), but at least in modern
history there has existed a diplomatic interest in not alienating
Russia.
Between 1870 and 1945, French foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia
was tied intimately to the German "problem." The three formal
alliances between France and Russia (1893, 1935 and 1945) were all
specifically directed against Germany. Since the French defeat in the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, France has not been strong enough
to maintain her security alone. The French solution to this problem
has historically been to develop a system of alliances for encircling
and containing German military and economic power. Equally
important in establishing an alliance system with Russia was the aim
of precluding one from being formed between Russian and Germany
- the ultimate danger for the French as evidenced by the Rapallo Pact
of 1922 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939.
The reluctance of the French, particularly the French
conservatives, to enter an alliance with the Soviet Union both in
1935 and 1945 was based mainly on ideological reasons. During the
interwar period, the prevailing question was one of which to fear
more - communism or nazism. Only after Hitler's abandonment of
the League of Nations and his decision to rearm did the question
61 Pierre Hassner, "France and the Soviet Union," in Western Approaches to the Soviet Union , ed.
Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 29.
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appear to be decisively answered. After World War Two had ended
and the heroism of the Red Army and the sufferings of the Russian
people at the hands of the Germans produced a wave of sympathy
over the French, this tempered the prevailing conflict between
democracy and totalitarianism and paved the way for De Gaulle's
1945 alliance with the Soviets.
De Gaulle's objectives always aimed at the same final goal: the
greatest possible independence for France as an independent
European nation and in its relations with the two superpowers.
During World War Two, De Gaulle threatened to move his
headquarters to Moscow to increase his bargaining power with the
U.S. and Britain. During his term in office from 1944-46, De Gaulle
persistently sought a bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union
claiming that France had common interests with the Soviet Union
that it did not share with the allies - specifically De Gaulle's interest
in Germany and his desire to divide it into several states and annex
the Saarland for France. De Gaulle's disappointment in not being
invited to Yalta led to his denouncing the "deliberate partition of
Europe" as a superpower tactic to maintain control over the
continent. This led to an even greater quest for independence and a
push for De Gaulle's idea of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals".
In the mid-1960's, De Gaulle turned to the oldest strategy in
the French repertoire. Approaching the Soviet Union, De Gaulle
offered himself as a partner in detente against the American
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"hegemon" and his West German "continental sword".62 Likewise, De
Gaulle's "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" was being
increasingly cited in French political circles. However, De Gaulle's
vision of a Europe liberated from the domination of the superpowers
was rudely shattered by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968, and the Gaullist hopes of the blocs giving way to a flexible
diplomatic system were now condemned to failure.63
The result of these and other incidents has led France since
1945 to distance itself from the common Western position, with
respect to the Soviet Union, and adopt an independent Eastern
position. A central objective of De Gaulle's "Europe from the Atlantic
to the Urals" was to distance France from NATO, meanwhile reducing
the American presence in Europe and inducing Russia to relax its rule
and reduce its own presence in Eastern Europe; thereby opening the
way for a reassertion of national autonomies and European influence,
particularly French influence.64 Ironically, history has now taken a
new twist: other countries, most notably Germany and the United
States have assumed this Gaullist path of detente and bilateral
relations with the Soviet Union. Now it is France that is warily
reminding its allies of the still-present Soviet threat, the
corresponding necessity of maintaining a military balance, and of the
danger of decoupling the United States from Europe.
62 Pierre Hassner, "The View from Paris," in Eroding Empire - Western Relations with Eastern Europe ,
ed., Lincoln Gordon (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 145.
63 Roger Morgan, West European Politics since 1945: The Shaping of the European Community
(London: B.T. BatsfordLtd, 1972), 161.
64 Hassner, "France and the Soviet Union," 33.
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B. FRENCH SECURITY POLICY PRIOR TO GORBACHEVS "NEW
POLITICAL THINKING"
In 1966, De Gaulle announced France's pursuit of an
independent security policy based on strategic nuclear forces; this
ideal has remained largely unchanged to the present. The French
believe that the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Europe is unreliable and
that only France's "proportional deterrent" can guarantee the
security of France. "Proportional deterrence" protects France against
Soviet aggression through the use of tactical nuclear warning shots at
France's frontiers that will convince the Soviets of France's
willingness to execute its counter-city threats. 65 Should the Soviets
in return choose to strike France's air bases and IRBM's, then France
would, almost certainly, strike Soviet cities with its surviving SLBM's
and bombers. In effect, France's threat of nuclear retaliation alone
can deter the Soviet Union from attacking France because the
damage France could cause from targeting Soviet cities exceeds what
the Soviets would stand to gain in conquering or destroying France.
After 1980, French policy stressing the "anti-cities" approach was
revised placing greater emphasis on destroying the infrastructure of
the Soviet economy and administration.66
Soviet opinions and evaluations of France as the potential
adversary are largely unknown. Thus, the credibility of France's
nuclear deterrent remains to date, uncertain. However, it is known
65 Yost, "The French Way of War," 16.
66 Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture, Part I, 15.
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that the Soviet government does not view France's withdrawal from
NATO's integrated military structure as removing France from the
allied camp if hostilities broke out. The Soviets have repeatedly
stressed that "France's political and military leadership does not rule
out the possibility of using French forces within the NATO system,"
given the frequency of French participation in various NATO
exercises, maneuvers, and planning and communication activities. 67
Therefore, it would be logical to assume that the Soviet government
would most likely view the French as a belligerent in any East-West
conflict.
C. GLASNOST, PERESTROIKA AND "NEW POLITICAL
THINKING"
The catalyst for Mikhail Gorbachev's thorough restructuring,
"perestroika", of all aspects of Soviet life - social, political, moral and
economic, was the Soviet Union's deepening economic crisis and the
gradual but severe erosion of the ideological and moral values of its
citizens. Attempts to modify socialism in the Soviet Union are not
without precedent, although the magnitude of Gorbachev's reforms
are certainly new. Between World War Two and Gorbachev's
appointment as President in March 1985, the Soviet Union saw four
main phases of reform.68 All four phases failed to produce any
significant results.
67 ibid., 33.
68 For a synopsis of these phases see Perestroika - And now for the hard part," The Economist . 28 April
1990, 9.
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The purpose of perestroika is accelerated socio-economic
development - to achieve the highest world levels of social
productivity in the shortest possible time. Gorbachev calls
perestroika an "urgent necessity" which arose as a result of processes
of development in the Soviet socialist society.69 In his book he
describes perestroika as "the all-round intensification of the Soviet
economy, the revival and development of the principles of
democratic centralism in running the national economy, the universal
introduction of economic methods, the renunciation of management
by injunction and by administrative methods, and the overall
encouragement of innovation and Socialist enterprise." 70
Equally important, the concept of "glasnost" (openness) "in all
spheres of life is one of the most crucial conditions for the further
promotion of perestroika processes, for making perestroika
irreversible." 71 Gorbachev cites the essence of perestroika as
inherent in the fact that it unites socialism with democracy and
glasnost is an indispensable condition for true democracy.72
Gorbachev sees glasnost as not only critical to the domestic scene, but
also essential in the international arena as a promoter of peace and
cooperation, and a means to conduct an "open" foreign policy.
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Paramount to Gorbachev's program has been the immediate
acceleration of scientific and technological progress in an attempt to
narrow the scientific-technological gap between the Soviet Union and
the advanced industrial nations. The purpose of accelerated
advancement in the technological area is to stimulate economic
growth, which would in turn, reverse the decrepit social and moral
conditions of Soviet society and restore confidence in the badly
decaying Communist Party.
The realization of Gorbachev's dream of perestroika will prove
impossible without a major reallocation of resources from the
military to the civilian sector of the economy. This meant halting the
Soviet military build up of the 1990's. Thus came about the policy of
"new political thinking". From Gorbachev's perspective, rebuilding
the political, economic and social sectors of the Soviet Union were
intimately tied to economic reform with significant implications for
defense. 73
In his book Perestroika . Gorbachev advanced a fundamental
change in ideology. He acknowledged that the 20th Party Congress in
1956 recognized war as no longer inevitable in the nuclear age and
he extended the idea that the advent of nuclear weapons created a
new kind of interest apart from class interests - "humankind
interests" which transcends class struggle because it involves saving
mankind from total destruction. 74 Traditionally, Marxist-Leninist
73 Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security,
International Security . Fall 1988, 129.
74 William E. Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," Foreign Affairs . Winter 1988/89, 129.
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thought viewed war as a positive phenomenon because war has often
triggered revolutions. However, with the advent of nuclear weapons
and the possibility of global nuclear conflict, world civilization would
inevitably perish. Therefore, the Soviet Union must join with the
imperialist states to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war. In
Gorbachev's words, "The fundamental principle of the new political
outlook is very simple: nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving
political, economic, ideological or any other goals." 75
By mid- 1987, all the major tenets of Gorbachev's "new political
thinking" had been articulated. They included:
- War prevention as the fundamental component of Soviet
military doctrine;
- No war, nuclear as well as conventional, can be considered a
rational continuation of politics;
- Political means of enhancing security are more effective than
military-technical means;
- Security is indivisible: one nation's security cannot be
enhanced by increasing other nations' insecurity;
- 'reasonable sufficiency' should be the basis for the future
development of combat capabilities vice military superiority;
- Soviet military strategy should be based on 'defensive
defense' (non-provocative), vice offensive capabilities and
operations. 76
Of all the ideas inherent in the concept of "new political
thinking", none has captured the attention of the world as much as
the idea of "reasonable sufficiency". Gorbachev first raised this notion
during the 27th Party Congress, when he said that the Soviet Union
75 Gorbachev, Perestroika. 126.
76 Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects," 133; and Gorbachev, Perestroika . 125-130.
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would limit its nuclear potential to levels of reasonable sufficiency. 77
However, what constitutes reasonable sufficiency is a question that
has yet to be decisively answered.
The French also define their deterrence doctrine in terms of
reasonable sufficiency. They define reasonable sufficiency as the
capacity of French strategic forces to inflict on the Soviets damage of
such intensity so as to offset the advantage that the Soviets might
gain by controlling France. 78 Soviet definitions of reasonable
sufficiency appear to be something different.
Army General Dmitriy Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense,
discussed reasonable sufficiency in an article entitled "Warsaw Treaty
Military Doctrine." His definition is generally shared by the majority
of Soviet officials:
When we speak about maintaining the armed forces, our
military potential within the limits of reasonable sufficiency,
we mean that at the present stage the essence of sufficiency for
the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union is determined
by the need to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack in any,
even the most unfavourable situation. As far as conventional
weapons are concerned, sufficiency envisages an amount and
quality of armed forces and armaments which would be
enough to reliably ensure collective defence of the socialist
community. The limits of sufficiency are determined not by us
but by the actions of the United States and NATO. The Warsaw
Treaty member states do not strive for military superiority and
do not claim greater security than other countries but they will
never agree to lesser security and will never tolerate military
77 Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects," 144-145.
78 Presentation by Dr. Jean-Francois Delpech, Director of the Center for Research and Evaluation of
Strategies and Technologies, France, given at the New Alternatives Workshop, Defense Nuclear Agency,
Nov 1989, K-2.
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superiority over them. The existing military-strategic parity
remains the decisive factor of preventing war. 79
Gorbachev introduced the concept of reasonable sufficiency as
the basis of a purely defensive military doctrine. Although the
Soviets have always maintained that their military doctrine was
defensive, they acknowledged, however, that they would resort to
offensive military force if the socialist world was ever threatened.
However, the new concept of defensive defense is a significant
departure from this idea. According to one Western interpreter.
"Defensive defense connotes a force posture and military strategy
sufficient to repel a conventional attack, but incapable of conducting a
surprise attack with massive offensive operations against the
territory of the other side." 80 Since conventional weapons normally
represent the largest portion of a state's military spending, the
combination of reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense provide
an opportunity for significant reductions in the Soviet defense budget
- precisely what Gorbachev needs - the release of resources from the
military sector to the civilian sector.
The ultimate goal of Gorbachev's new political thinking is
disarmament as demonstrated in his statement of 15 January 1986
calling for universal nuclear disarmament by the year 2000: "The
Soviet Union calls upon all peoples and states, and, naturally, above
all nuclear states, to support the programme of eliminating nuclear
79
"Yazov writes on Pact Military Doctrine," FBIS-JPRS-UMA-88-005, Warsaw Pact, 10 March 1988.
25.
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weapons before the year 2000.
"
81 Conventional weapons were cited
as well: "In addition to eliminating weapons of mass destruction from
the arsenals of states, the Soviet Union proposes that conventional
weapons and armed forces become subject to agreed-upon
reductions." 82 The Soviet Union has cited its willingness to make
unilateral reductions as proof of its commitment to the above
objectives. They claim, for example, that today's Soviet Armed Forces
have dropped in numerical strength by 265,000 persons, over 9,300
tanks, over 5,000 artillery systems, 835 combat aircraft and 40
combatant ships. 83 However, major ambiguity exists in terms of any
redeployment or subsequent disposition of these assets - no promise
has been made to destroy the equipment. 84
D. FRENCH POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION SINCE
1985
Throughout much of the 1980s, relations between France and
the Soviet Union were characterized by mutual suspicion, sometimes
even overt hostility. The USSR perceived France as "the leader of a
gradually maturing effort by the members of the Western European
Union (WEU) to create a collective West European defense capability
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within the overall framework of the Atlantic Alliance." 85 Conversely,
France perceived the Soviets as attempting to decouple the U.S. from
Europe, in terms of nuclear weapons and forces, drive a wedge in
NATO, and ultimately eliminate the independent British and French
nuclear forces. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover the
skepticism with which Gorbachev's new political thinking has met in
France.
With the arrival in power of Mitterrand in 1981, the special
relationship between France and the Soviet Union began to
deteriorate. Mitterrand became a prominent spokesman for the
European "hard liners." After Gorbachev came to power in 1985,
Mitterrand's attitude shifted and he began to advocate new, more
positive developments in East-West relations. Contacts between
Paris and the Kremlin became more frequent, but because
Mitterrand would make no concessions on including the French
nuclear forces in the arms control process, no significant progress in
improving Franco-Soviet relations was possible.
The 1987 INF agreement was feared by the majority of French
as a means for the superpowers to once again attempt to jointly
control the world. An even greater fear was that in future
negotiations, their own nuclear forces would be included. Former
French Defense Minister Giraud referred to the entire proposal as a
trap whose acceptance would mean a new Munich.86
85 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," Draft paper for presentation at the conference on Force mobilization,
the Revolutions of 1989, and the Future of European Security, National Defense University, Washington,
D.C., 19-21 June 1990, 2.
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Toward the end of the 1980's, the French became less and less
impervious to the enigmatic character and ideas of Gorbachev and
soon began praising the prospects of superpower detente and
disarmament as long as they were balanced reductions. Also during
this time, Mitterrand became aware of the growing anti-nuclear and
anti-American sentiments in Germany. Worsened by what he
perceived to be the declining credibility of the U.S. commitment to
Europe, Mitterrand also feared that Germany would lean toward
neutralism and become more susceptible to Soviet domination. Thus
came about the renewed French policies of anchoring Germany
firmly in the West, by means of NATO and the EC, and encouraging
Atlantic unity and the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe.
The French view the continued commitment of the United
States to European defense as remaining indispensable, at least in the
near future, for serving as the counter-weight to the military power
of the Soviet Union. 87 Paris perceives the substance of Soviet policy
to remain relatively unchanged: it is still Soviet policy to create
circumstances that will weaken West European-U.S. cooperation and
commitments, and eventually lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Europe, leaving NATO essentially denuclearized. Furthermore,
the French want the United States to remain the ultimate strategic
guarantee against a very powerful Soviet Union that will emerge if
perestroika succeeds in bringing about economic recovery. Lastly,
France and Britain want to prevent the denuclearization of Europe
87 David S. Yost, "Evolving French Attitudes on NATO and European Security," paper presented at the
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., 18 July 1990, 4.
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which would reduce Europe to a subordinate position with respect to
the two superpowers.88
Clearly, France is not wholly convinced of the irreversibility of
the changes occurring in the Soviet Union. The French cite the fact
that regardless of what the political future of Europe holds, the
Soviet Union will remain a military superpower and certainly the
dominant military power on the European continent. Furthermore,
as former Defense Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement asked, "who
knows whom it will serve in 10 or 20 years' time?" 89 Chevenement
postulated that the European theater is becoming less stable as a
result of the uncertain evolution of Eastern European countries and
the emergence of internal nationality conflicts.90 The corollary of
Chevenement's argument is that "the position of France in Europe
will depend, now more than ever, on its independent defense
posture." 91 The Prime Minister, Michel Rocard advanced a similar
argument:
... in spite of his genius, Mr. Gorbachev will die one day, maybe
under bad political circumstances. He will have a successor, and
Soviet army marshals cannot be excluded. Soviet military
power remains a problem as long as there is not a negotiated
security system.92
88 Geoffrey Lee Williams, Coming in from the Cold: The Evolution of French Defence Policy (London:
The Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1989), 41.
89 Alexandra Schwartzbrod, "Ebbing Eastern Threat Gnaws at France's "Independent Defense" Stance,"
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Moreover, the idea of a nuclear-free world by the year 2000, as
put forth by Gorbachev in 1986, has been viewed by the French with
grave skepticism and normally called an extravagant, unrealizable
propaganda attempt. Some have claimed that Gorbachev's only
reason for making such a statement was to gain the initiative in the
superpower relationship by placing the West in a reactive position.93
Many others have argued that the Soviets would be in favor of a
denuclearized world because it would leave them with an
overwhelming conventional military superiority. Whatever
Gorbachev's reason for advancing the idea of a nuclear-free world, its
attainment is viewed as highly unlikely for reasons identical to those
of the French: without nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would
instantly lose its rank, status and independence as a global military
power.
As a result of the Soviet Union's continued ability to pose a
threat to NATO, the unpredictability of the internal turmoil in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and threats in the world other than
those from the East, France is unlikely to seriously participate in arms
control negotiations in the foreseeable future. The French view any
attempt to cut nuclear weapons as a threat to their security and
independence. Indicative of this was their reaction when the United
States announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. The
French saw the U.S. desire to transcend the nuclear world as a threat
to the credibility of the French national deterrent and to the validity
93 Peter Frank, "Internal Constraints on Soviet Security Policy," paper presented at the Maritime
Conference '90, "Decade of the '90s - Response to Change," Greenwich, U.K., Royal Naval Staff College,
14 February 1989, 10.
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of France's claim to the status of a global power.94 Moreover, the
French view the Soviet acknowledgement of the impossibility of
winning a nuclear war as the main reason that incites them to seek
the denuclearization of Europe. 95 Therefore, the French see
deterrence which relies solely on conventional means as clearly
unable to guarantee peace; thus, nuclear deterrence must remain the
cornerstone of security in the Western World.
Mitterrand's response to the uncertainties of the situation in
Europe has been more rapid, persistent moves toward West European
unity. Mitterrand sees the European Community's role as one of
promoting economic development and political liberalization in the
newly forming East European governments, and particularly useful in
anchoring a united Germany firmly in the West. Mitterrand sees his
goal of political unity in the European Community as consistent with
the current emphasis on arms control and detente and a means for
dealing with the unpredictability of Soviet power.
E. SOME PERSPECTIVES
The French solution to the uncertain future of the Soviet Union
lies in the requirement for the West European nations to develop a
common approach to their military security and in the continued U.S.
nuclear commitment to Western Europe. For the French, this entails
94 Among numerous sources on this subject see, Fredrik Wetterqvist, French Security and Defence Policy:
Current Developments and Future Prospects (National Defence Research Institute, Department of Defence
Analysis S 10254 Stockholm, 1990), 3; and Dominique Moisi, "French Foreign Policy: The Challenge of
Adaptation," Foreign Affairs . Fall 1988, 154.
95 Renouveau Defense, "Defense After Reykjavik: Initiatives to be taken by France," 20 January 1989,
15.
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the creation of a "European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance and the
urgent necessity for the Alliance to adopt a new political posture in
response to the situation created by the Soviet's "new political
thinking". The French are particularly concerned that the
increasingly benign perception of the USSR in Western Europe will
fuel public opinion pressure to dismantle NATO, thereby decoupling
the U.S. from Western Europe, and also making the construction of a
West European political union within the European Community a
difficult, if not impossible, enterprise.96
France should continue to view the changing Soviet threat
conservatively. The Soviet Union, currently destabilized as a result
of the partial reforms that have taken place, is still a powerful
military giant. Furthermore, the Soviets continue to engage in a
concerted effort to develop numerous additional high-technology
weapon programs that are key to force modernization. Therefore,
because the outcome of the current turmoil in the Soviet Union is
unpredictable, France should maintain its current military posture
and continue its pursuit of the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. Arms control negotiations should support deterrence based
on a negotiated and commonly defined sufficiency doctrine.
Adequate Western military power has contributed to the forces of
change in the Soviet Union - that power continues to be necessary in
ensuring those forces of change move in the right direction.
96 Palmer, "France," 4.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND THE END
OF THE POSTWAR DIVISION OF EUROPE ON FRENCH
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY POLICIES
The year 1989 saw the beginning of a process which in a year's
time brought the reunification of Germany, the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe and the formal end of the Cold War.
Yet because European security in the postwar period has depended
on the partition of Germany and of Europe, these remarkable yet
unexpected developments have had profound implications for West
European, and particularly French, security policy.
Despite France's long-standing commitment in principle to
German self-determination, rapid unification evoked considerable
concern for several reasons. Initially there were fears that the East
German government would simply collapse, leading to turmoil which
perhaps would involve Soviet forces. Later emerged much stronger
and more verbal fears stemming from the prospect of the recreation
of a powerful German state in the heart of Europe. These fears
revolve around two issues: the political and economic power of this
new German state; and the role it is likely to play in a new European
security structure.
A further issue of somewhat less importance to the French than
the German problem, is the evolution of the Eastern European
nations, and particularly, the Soviet Union. Although France is the
least pro-Gorbachevian country in Europe and remains somewhat
skeptical of the permanence of Gorbachev's "new political thinking,"
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it now too considers the Soviet Union unable to reclaim its dominance
in Eastern Europe without massive military intervention which is
perceived as improbable, if not inconceivable. According to French
policy-makers, regardless of its political future, the Soviet Union will
remain the single largest military power in Europe, a power that
necessarily must be cautiously balanced.
The French also believe that the European theater as a whole is
becoming less stable as a result of the uncertain evolution of Eastern
European countries and the emergence of internal nationality
conflicts. The uncertainty of the future political situation in Eastern
Europe, coupled with the still-present German question, is rapidly
evolving into one of the most important debates in French political
history - France's proper role in an undivided Europe.
A. FRENCH FEARS OF RISING GERMAN POWER
Two thousand years ago when German tribesmen ambushed
three Roman legions advancing from the Rhine, the Roman historian
Tacitus called the German's ferocious style of warfare the "furor
Teutonicus" and wrote that, given to drinking and fighting, the
Germans were tough, hardened warriors "fanatically loyal to their
leaders" concluding, "Rest is unwelcome to the race."97 This image
has endured and even intensified as a result of the horrors of two
world wars. Fear of the Germans, although perhaps in abeyance for
the 40 years the continent was divided into a bipolar world, is on the
97 Bruce W. Nelan, "Anything to Fear?" Time . 26 March 1990, 32.
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rise again triggered by the realization that Europe's destiny is no
longer controlled by the rival superpowers.
For obvious historical reasons, France appears the most
concerned of the West European countries about how the newly
reunified Germany will settle into its new role. This is justifiable also
since France, more than any other country with the possible
exception of Poland, stands to be the most affected by unification.
Mitterrand, and German chancellor, Mr. Helmut Kohl, have had a
close and cordial relationship for approximately nine years. This
relationship is one of many French-German relations that have
survived numerous changes in power in Paris and Bonn. In spite of
this close association, recent French anxiety over German pre-
occupation with unity and simultaneous German annoyance over
French ambivalence or even hostility concerning the reunification,
are causing increased French-German friction.
Many French officials are alarmed at the idea of the enormous
economic potential and political influence of the united Germany in
Europe and the even greater potential for German dominance of the
European Community. Germany has been France's most important
ally and its principal economic partner, accounting for some 40% of
French trade.98 There are fears that Germany has now acquired a
significant advantage which will have a detrimental effect on
France's own role, and change the existing balance of power in the EC.
Opinion polls suggest that no one doubts that the former GDR,
following a transition to a market economy, will be just as able to
98
"A relationship in the balance," The Economist. 6 October 1990, 53.
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bring about an economic miracle as the Federal Republic of Germany
was after the 1948 currency reform."
French apprehension centers on the idea that the new Germany
will simply be too big and powerful to make a reliable partner in
West European integration. This apprehension is manifest in
statements such as the one made by former French Prime Minister
Michel Debre in February 1990 when he spoke warily about the
prospect of a united German nation: "We French, who know our
neighbors well, how can we not remind all Europeans and the world
as a whole of the need to guard against abuses which Germany
commits in all areas when it sees an opportunity." 100 For these
individuals, the inhuman crimes of the Third Reich are as vivid today
as they were during the war. The Germans are once again asserting
themselves and the result has been growing fearfulness of German
hegemony among the French.
B. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER OF THE NEW
GERMANY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FRANCE
Writing between the first and second world wars, De Gaulle
described Germany as "a sublime but glaucous sea where the
fisherman's net hauls up monsters and treasures." 101 This dichotomy
appears to have renewed meaning and is resurfacing as the
™ Karl Jetter, "French fears about emergence of a super economic force," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
fur Deutschland . 13 December 1989, cited in The German Tribune . 24 December 1989 - No. 1400, 2.
100 Nelan, "Anything to Fear?" 32.
101 De Gaulle as cited in "They like it and they fear it," The Economist . 27 January 1990, 50.
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prevalent French view of German reunification with respect to the
present economic situation.
Centuries before Bismarck's era, Germany's division into
approximately 1,000, then 300, then 39 separate states was seen by
the other Europeans as necessary in maintaining the continental
balance of power. Since 1945, the existence of two German states
has been widely regarded in much the same way. The Western
allies, particularly Great Britain and France, formally backed the
cause of peaceful German reunification for years. But it appears their
true attitude is closer to Francois Mauriac's "I love Germany so much,
I am happy there are two." 102 While these countries have officially
supported the recent reunification of Germany, it is also evident that
their collective memory has allowed them to be quite content with
the postwar division that, in the eyes of many Europeans,
successfully contributed to the peace of the European continent for
the past 45 years. Perhaps the respected German President, Richard
von Weizsaecker, said it most eloquently when he wrote several
years ago that, "most Europeans dislike the wall about as much as
they do the idea of a large German state in the center of Europe." 103
Paradoxically, while government, intellectual and newspaper
circles in Paris publicly supported and privately fretted over the idea
of a unified Germany, opinion polls indicated that two of three
102 Mauriac as cited in "West German Survey," The Economist . 28 October 1989, 4.
103 yon Weizsaecker as cited in Pierre Lellouche, "A Void at Europe's Heart," Newsweek. 27 November
1989, 4.
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French citizens favored it. 104 Distrust for Germany lingers among
those who remember the war. Among those who are fearful, the
young are much more confident than the middle-aged, and the main
concern that is cited consistently is Germany's economic challenge. 105
1. The French Economy: From the 1980s to the
Present
For most of the 1980's, the French economy was
declining: the economy was stalled and many of its well known
companies were on the verge of collapse. But in the last few years of
the decade, an economic bloom gave rise to new confidence
everywhere. The French began to see themselves as a major
economic power and some were beginning to cite France as, once
again, the center of Europe. 106 French investment was back on track,
growing even faster than that of its European rivals. French industry
became competitive again, exports rose substantially, consumer
spending saw a boom, and forecasters notched up growth predictions
to three percent. 107
This prediction proved correct. The French economy
grew by over 4 percent in 1989, an estimated 3.1 percent in 1990,
104 Alan Riding, "Where Nazis Took Fierce Revenge, French Hatred for Germans Recedes," The New
York Times
. 7 March 1990, A6.
105
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and it is projected to grow by 2.8 percent in 1991. 108 For the first
time in nearly 11 years, inflation in France could fall below that of
Germany - to 2.9 percent. 109 France has become what most nations
aspire to be - a low inflation, strong currency economy.
France has also been busily drafting ambitious new plans
for a new Europe. French politicians argue that if the European
Community becomes united economically by 1992, as planned by the
Community's agenda, Paris would be the natural center and France
the leading nation in this new economic order. Paramount to this
idea of Paris becoming the European center is its necessarily
simultaneous designation as the seat of Continental Europe's financial
center. To this end, French officials have opened the door to futures
and options trading and ended the monopoly trading rights of small
French brokers. 110 This new French business ethic was intended to
provide confidence building measures which would, in turn perhaps,
enable France to gain ground against the growing German economy.
Notwithstanding the fact that France's economic might is
smaller than Germany's, some statistics on French production are
relatively impressive. A country of 58 million people, France is the
world's fourth largest exporter, fourth biggest capitalist economy,
108
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and has the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. 111 It is also the
world's second largest producer of nuclear energy. Outwardly, at
least, the French appear more sure of themselves than the people of
any other European nation.
Yet, perhaps the French realize, more than any other
nation, that much of being important depends on acting as if you are:
De Gaulle used this prestige principle to help France recover its self-
confidence after defeat in the second world war and the upheaval of
decolonization in Indochina and Algeria. 112 However bright this
French economic picture appears, whether justified or not, it has not
stifled fears about a large, economically powerful, German state in
the center of Europe.
2. Germany in 1991
Reunification had two aspects: the forging of normal and
ever tighter links between two societies and the merging of two
states. 113 According to several well-publicized polls, the French
welcome the prospect of a better way of life for the East Germans
and are enthusiastic about its imminence. Yet the prospect of
growing German power encites fears reminiscent of a Germany
during World War Two.
What seemingly lies ahead for Germany is a potential
economic giant capable of rising to be the dominating economic
1
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power in Europe. Statistical charts published in French newspapers
attempt to show that the united Germany with a population of 80
million people (a quarter of all the people in Western Europe;
compared to France with 58 million, and with an industrial
production figure over twice that of France, will advance to become
the undisputed market leader in major industries in East and
West.'- 1 - This economic giant possesses a gross national product
nearly equal to that of France and Britain combined, and at least for
the present, possesses the most powerful army on the continent with
the exception of the Soviet Union.
Although Chancellor Kohl insisted that a reunified
Germany would respect relevent treaties and the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act, and that reunification would be placed in a context
of European integration, 115 many French people, including many
governmental officials, and particularly the French president, were
not fully convinced. President Mitterrand defined his country's
rationale as follows: France supported the right of self-
determination of the Germans, but not in 1990. 116 He was said to
have told Mr. Kohl that France was opposed to an unconditional end
to the division of Germany and felt that neither East nor WTest
1 14 Karl Jetter, Trench fears about emergence of a super economic force," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
fur Deutschland. 13 December 1989, cited in The German Tribune . 24 December 1989 - No. 1400, 2.
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Germans were unconditionally entitled to self-determination. 117
President Mitterrand was adamant that the wartime Allies and even
the countries of Europe were entitled to a vote in the matter, and he
went to great lengths to make his views known to the rest of the
European community.
3. Mitterrand's Agenda
President Mitterrand believes France's main objective is
to be able to defend herself against any aggression and therefore be
able to maintain her identity and independence. 118 Paramount to
this objective, he believes, is that a sound defense is impossible
without a healthy economy. 119 He speaks often about the history of
European divisions and the need for Europeans to act decisively to
build a united Europe that could change the course of history.
Throughout his presidency, Mitterrand has struggled to
speed European integration with the creation of the single market by
1992, and if he has his way, the expeditious creation of economic,
monetary, and political union. An accepted but unspoken reason for
French haste was German reunification. The French view economic
and monetary union mainly as a political means of binding the
Community, and specifically Germany, closer together. For France,
1 17 Uwe Karsten Petersen, "Kohl and Mitterrand make their points in private talks," Per Tagespiegel.
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the European Community is not just a common market, but the core
of a future political and economic Europe.
More specifically, President Mitterrand envisages a
"European Confederation" based on the 12-member European
Community which would be run by Paris with backing from Bonn. 120
His aim is to persuade the 12-nation European Community to move
in the direction of a type of federal system which would complement
the economic system that will emerge as the European Community
dismantles its internal trade barriers by 1992. Eventually, the six
European Free Trade Association countries (Austria, Switzerland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland) would be allowed to join it as
well, as would East European countries that have turned democratic -
but only after a framework for political union in the EC has been
agreed upon.
The French worry that changes in the East will harm their
efforts to make the European Community more than just a high-
grade common market. French concentration currently lies with
monetary and political union, and they see the East European
question as somewhat of a distraction to what should be the
Community's main concern. The French see this as a way to "deepen"
the Community. 121 They believe a Community with a political
dimension is finally the best way to bind Germany to Western
120 Rudolph Chimelli, "French take a pragmatic line towards changes in Germany," Siiddeutsche Zeitung.
Munich
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Europe. For a discussion of political union in the EC, please see page
79. Mitterrand believes that if the 12 European Community nations
can truly integrate, they can become a magnet capable of attracting
increasing economic and technological links with the East European
countries and the Soviet Union itself - in the long run, he sees the
European Community growing to the East and developing into a new
world power. 122 This new world power would assert a more
independent role in the new era of detente and would compete
economically against America and Japan.
Mitterrand believes that the Soviet leader faces growing
difficulties and challenges to maintaining his power structure within
the Soviet Union. Gorbachev reportedly made the suggestion to
Mitterrand that he may fall if the democratic forces that are afoot
are allowed to proceed too rapidly and sporadically. Thus,
Mitterrand views the potential for disaster and a return to hostile
Soviet/Western relations as able to occur at any time. This could
lead to a rapid rise in old rivalries that could threaten to upset the
balance of power in Europe. Mitterrand's solution to this perceived
great danger is stronger, more rapid moves toward European
integration. He recently stated:
If we want to transcend these traditional rivalries, then only
one great thought, one great constructive endeavor, can take
the place of all this. That could be a great mission for the
European Community - if it is something that can prove to be
122 Karen Elliott House and E.S. Browning, "Mitterrand Sees Europe at the Crossroads," Wall Street
Journal . 22 November 1989, A6.
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stronger than everyone's desire to be master of his own
village. 123
Mitterrand's initiative is aimed at achieving De Gaulle's
well-known objective of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
However, if this initiative is successful, it will be a much more tightly
knit Europe than the loose grouping of nations that De Gaulle had
envisioned in the 1960s.
4. The Role of the EC after German Reunification
Mitterrand's view of unified Germany anchored tightly in
the EC is a view shared by many Frenchmen as well as other
Europeans. Klaus Harpprecht, a well known author and former
speech writer for Willy Brandt, West German chancellor in the early
1970s, clarified this view:
The great problem of a united Germany in the past was that its
weight overwhelmed the rest of Europe. Our neighbors
wouldn't be quite so upset if the European Community had
developed enough authority to counter-balance this fear today.
The Warsaw Pact doesn't exist anymore, NATO is weakening as
a force capable of providing this kind of order, and the only
thing left is the European Community. The most urgent task
before us is to accelerate steps toward European unity. 124
Helmut Schmidt, former West German chancellor,
theorized that, "It was a major mistake not to create the European
monetary system years ago, to really persuade the French that
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Germany was willing to be a real part of the European system." 125
He says, "We need a European Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe, and
the European Community leaders should be sitting around, talking
about it informally - but it isn't happening." 126
How the united Germans will use their economic power is,
of course, the main question. It is unknown whether the EC will be
able to survive in its present form or whether it will be strong
enough to weather this storm and eventually evolve into a wider
grouping that would amicably comprise Eastern as well as Western
nations. Whether or not the EC is able to accomplish this
consolidation of Eastern and Western nations, one major concern is
whether it will become dominated by German economic and
monetary power - what some term as a potential Fourth German
Economic Reich. 127 In principle, Germany now has the potential to be
the main generator of economic power and prosperity in central
Europe.
a. The founding of the EC
Although Adolf Hitler was the main catalyst of the
European Community, it was, after all, largely a French invention; the
architect was Jean Monnet. 128 In 1950, Monnet's proposal paved the
way for the Franco-West German reconciliation which has been the
125 ibid.
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essential element underlying all subsequent progress towards
European unity. 129 Monnet's proposal, which was later put forward
by the French government as the Schuman Plan, named after the
French foreign minister, allowed for a single High Authority to
supervise the disputes and future developments of the coal and steel
industries of participating nations. Monnet believed that the path to
European unity lay through economic, rather than military
coordination.
De Gaulle saw the European Economic Community as
a means of extending French influence. His relationship with Konrad
Adenauer, the West German chancellor at the time, is commonly
known to have been a close one. This alliance was formalized in the
Franco-West German treaty of 22 January 1963 (Elysee Treaty),
which provided for the coordination of the two countries' policies in
foreign affairs, defense, information and cultural affairs. 130
This coordination has been spasmodic, but
whenever France and West Germany have acted together within the
Community their influence has been enormous and they have
generally been able to achieve their objectives. Where they have not
done so, the Community has tended to drift and has found it difficult
or impossible to agree on a course of action. 131
President Mitterrand believes much progress has





said on occasion that the Elysee Treaty of 1963 provided for joint
action in a number of respects, but that the relevant clauses had
remained "a dead letter." 132 Thus, in January 1988, France and West
Germany marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Elysee Treaty
by adding two protocols, one of which established an Economic and
Financial Council. Bonn agreed to France's request for this council
partly in response to French complaints that Bonn had not yet repaid
France's moves with greater cooperation in economic and monetary
affairs. 133 By signing the protocol, Mr. Kohl was said to be
specifically trying to further Franco-German relations and hence, he
believed, European integration as well. 134
b. Is Monetary Union over the horizon?
Behind the purported eternal friendship claimed by
both sides, Franco-German relations have, in the past year, been
under considerable strain. Although Chancellor Kohl and President
Mitterrand have made several joint declarations since the breach of
the Berlin Wall and have heralded their countries as the motor of
European construction, officials of both governments have revealed
anxiety about their diverging interests.
French officials reportedly are disturbed that
despite Germany's dense commercial ties to its Western partners,
German preoccupation with melding the two former states into one
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and nurturing a new friendship with the Soviet Union has distracted
it from moving firmly and quickly toward European economic and
monetary union. 135 In spite of Foreign Minister Genscher's advocacy
of a rapid timetable for monetary union, German financial officials
are apparently wary that the stability of the Deutsche Mark will be
risked as a result of soaring unification costs.
Yet Kohl did agree in November 1990 with other
European leaders to set up a European central bank by 1994 that
would eventually govern a single currency which would supercede
all others including the Deutsche Mark. Then, in a surprising turn of
events that once again raised questions of Germany's commitment to
economic integration and monetary union, the German central bank
increased interest rates in February 1991, in a move to make the
country more attractive to international investors. German officials
justified the move as necessary to counteract the inflationary
potential of Chancellor Kohl's plans to finance the reconstruction of
eastern Germany through intense public-sector borrowing, however,
many foreign officials and economists overlooked the explanation
and simply claimed that the Bundesbank was sending a message that
national concerns continue to far outweigh any international
considerations. 136 "There are those who think of others and there
are those who think of themselves," claimed Pierre Beregovoy, the
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French finance minister. 137 Another economist claimed that "the
increase was a reminder that when these things (monetary union
and economic integration) come about, it will be on Germany's terms
and that for now, the Bundesbank can dictate policy to Europe." 138
Hence, the final blueprint and timetable for
economic and monetary union in the EC remains largely uncertain.
Since the French view tightening European links, particularly in the
EC, as the means to rein in the increased economic and political
power of the unified Germany, they are the most skeptical of
Germany's current position in the European arena and the perceived
low priority Germany has placed on European unity. For France, a
strong European identity bound tightly to European institutions is the
only condition under which Germany should assume its new identity.
5. Some Conclusions
A former American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,
made the well known statement concerning post-World War Two
Britain that it had lost an empire and not yet found a role. 139
Perhaps this statement can be applied, at least in some measure, to
France. France certainly lost its empire some time ago and appears
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Outwardly at least, the French appear more sure of
themselves and their rank in the world than most other countries.
Yet talking of rank can be a sign that one is not sure of it. One
example of this is the way the French judge themselves almost
obsessively against German manufactured exports.
For many years, Germany, although the stronger of the
two powers economically, was content to play the subordinate role;
when the views of German leaders differed from those of France,
they were often willing to defer to their partners, or at least refrain
from carrying their opposition to extremes. 140 These times are now
gone. The key to President Mitterrand's strategy to tighten European
economic ties is close cooperation with Bonn. This is one reason
President Mitterrand has attempted to forge even stronger bonds
with Chancellor Kohl in frequent meetings during the past several
years. What has also changed is that the French are finally forced to
come to terms with the fact that there once again exists French
reliance on others in matters of economics and defense.
France is adjusting very slowly to the fact that it is a
middle-sized power. In realizing that their national market is too
small to stand alone and that this "smallness" became amplified by
the recently united German economic powerhouse, the French are
once again learning to depend on their allies. In France, the "1992"
prospect for creating a true common market in Europe has a special
meaning that it lacks elsewhere in Europe.
140 Leonard, "Pocket Guide," 8.
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If Jean Monnet's postulate that political integration
follows necessarily from economic integration is accepted, some
exciting prospects lie ahead for Europe. Perhaps General de Gaulle's
Europe of a 'Concert of Powers' hinged on economic integration may
yet lie somewhere in the near future - perhaps 1992.
C. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE DIVISION OF
EUROPE
More so than any other West European country, French
security policy has been based upon the post-war division of Europe
and a West Germany laden with U.S. troops and nuclear weapons.
These long-standing assumptions have been shattered by the formal
renunciation of the Cold War.
Since the end of World War Two, in a divided Europe in which
the Soviet Union maintained control of Eastern Europe, Western
Europe has asked for and received U.S. assistance in defending itself
against Soviet forces in a forward position. American military power
was viewed as essential to the security of Western Europe, either
because West European states were unable to defend themselves or
because they had grown accustomed to the U.S. shouldering the
burden. 141
This U.S. nuclear and conventional commitment to Europe
allowed France to withdraw from NATO's integrated military
structure, claiming that its independence, autonomy and freedom of
action guaranteed by its own nuclear arsenal warranted this special
141 Jcane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs . 1989/1990, 12.
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status. However, France's special status is dependent on three things:
the continued U.S. commitment of weapons and troops to Europe
(which provide de facto protection for France as well); a united
Germany committed to western ideals and institutions, and
particularly committed to continued bilateral cooperation
arrangements with France; and the continued existence of the
postwar division of Europe. 142
Faced with certain U.S. military and nuclear force reductions in
Europe, a united Germany whose future role in NATO and the EC the
French view as unpredictable, the formal conclusion to the Cold War,
and the uncertain political and economic future of the Soviet Union
and the East European nations, the long-standing foundations of
French security policy have been unprecedently shaken. Thus, the
uncertainty of events and a growing realization of its own limitations
in discerning its future role in the newly evolving international
order, are conditioning France's approach in the current political
arena.
D. FRENCH GOALS FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE SECURITY ORDER
French policy-makers believe that despite movements in the
USSR toward democratization and economic liberalization, Russia's
great military power must still be offset by Western military power.
A largely unpredictable Soviet future has led President Mitterrand to
warn that "nothing can guarantee that a new Soviet power - which
might not be communist - wouldn't still be military and totalitarian,
14
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and that would be a great danger." 143 However, the French also
recognize the need to prevent the Soviet Union from feeling isolated
in a rapidly evolving anti-communist world.
These same desires for democratization and economic
liberalization are advanced for the East European countries, who are
increasingly subscribing to membership in the EC as a means to
obtain this democratization and economic liberalization. However,
the French have led discussions in the EC aimed at protecting it from
dilution of its political goals that current enlargement would bring.
Of great importance to the French is the goal of keeping
Germany firmly tied to Western institutions, specifically NATO, the
EC, and the WEU. Indeed, France deems the future of these
institutions as determined by German choices. 144 Naturally France
would prefer to keep or obtain the leadership role or a shared
leadership role in each of these institutions.
Finally, and above all, France would like to maintain the status
quo with respect to its perceived special status including its
independence, autonomy of decision and freedom of action. In order
to accomplish this goal, it is viewed as essential to maintain the U.S.
commitment to Europe, and NATO is seen as the organization most
likely to ensure this commitment.
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E. ALTERNATIVES FOR A NEW SECURITY ORDER
1. Neutrality
In 1952, in the midst of the Cold War, Stalin suggested to
the Germans that reunification could possibly be offered in return for
neutrality. Bonn flatly rejected the offer as it did again 40 years
later when President Gorbachev suggested this as the price for unity.
Although neutrality appeared initially attractive to some Frenchmen,
it was later determined potentially the most destabilizing of all
options.
Although Germany is currently tied to NATO, the French
fear that continued or unchanged participation in NATO cannot be
guaranteed. The French perceive that German leaders may soon
insist that full sovereignty and the "normalization" of Germany's
status dictate the removal of most, if not all, foreign military troops
and nuclear weapons including those based on aircraft. 145 In French
eyes, this could lead to a power vacuum in Central Europe that would
place France on the "front line" of a potential instability zone and
create the possibility of Russian coercion of Germany or Western
Europe as a whole. 146
Others have claimed that without U.S. nuclear weapons in
Germany, a dangerous imbalance in the center of Europe would exist.
This imbalance would by necessity, eventually drive the Germans to
seek nuclear weapons of their own, regardless of the fact that
145 ibid., 113.
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Germany has renounced this. 147 This in turn is a short step from the
development of a nationalistic military policy or the attempt to
organize a "Mitteleuropa" security zone under German hegemony.
If Germany begins to loosen ties with NATO and pursue a
more independent political path, there is also concern that a German-
Russian axis may develop. Many cite references to historical
precedents - the Rapallo Pact, the Hitler/Stalin Pact, and even the
German/Soviet cooperation treaty signed in late 1990 - as evidence
of this possibility. Although the Germans would have less to gain
than the Soviets in this arrangement, the situation would be enticing
to Russia who would benefit by desperately needed economic aid and
technical expertise.
If Germany were to move down the path of neutrality or
begin to organize Central Europe under German control or lean in the
direction of a German-Russian axis, France would soon become
politically and then most likely economically isolated. Because this
chain of events is seen as beginning from a denuclearization of
Germany, the U.S. commitment to Europe, and specifically,
maintaining U.S. military forces and nuclear weapons on German
territory, are deemed vital to French security.
2. The Pan-European Structure and the CSCE
Prior to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact's military
alliance on 31 March 1991, President Gorbachev's desire was that
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization "should not remain
147 Richard Perle, "The Right Kind of Missile Ban for Europe," The Wall Street Journal . 1 May 1990,
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military alliances," but instead evolve into "military-political
alliances and, later on, just political alliances." 148 This view was
underlined by former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
during his December 1989 visit to NATO headquarters when he
stated: "We believe the Warsaw Treaty and NATO at this crucial
stage in the European process can play an important stabilizing role
in stabilizing Europe." 149
However, the traditional Soviet objective of dissolving
both alliances in favor of a system of collective security for Europe
has not been abandoned. This pan-European collective security
structure has been advanced by Gorbachev as the "Common
European Home." By invoking De Gaulle's Atlantic-to-the-Urals
geographic definition of Europe, he advocated a Soviet presence and
role in the Europe of the future. 150 The vehicle that has been
proposed by the Soviets as the means of ensuring the security and
peace of Europe is the CSCE.
France initially championed such ideas as evidence of
Soviet "new thinking." Mitterrand had long held similar ideals of a
"European Confederation," although the specifics of which have never
been identified. However, the enthusiasm of some Germans, notably
Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher who began speculating about
"transcending the alliances" in this "all-European peace order" that
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would produce "collective security," 151 provoked concern among the
French who began to see this movement as another Soviet attempt to
break up NATO and de-couple the U.S. from Europe.
The French acknowledge the value of the CSCE in giving
the East European countries and the Soviet Union an organization to
assist in the transition to democratic societies. However, the French
consensus has been that for the immediate future, the CSCE is
woefully inadequate to assume primary responsibility for a stable
European peace - its cumbersome size and unanimity rule yield too
many uncertainties to serve as a basis for real stability.
Recently, in an attempt to strengthen the CSCE by
institutionalizing it, it was agreed that the CSCE should accomplish
the following: adopt a program for regular consultations every year
and CSCE review conferences every two years; establish a small CSCE
secretariat; enact a mechanism to monitor elections in all 34 CSCE
countries; install a Center for the Prevention of Conflict that might
serve as a forum for exchanges of military information, discussions of
unusual military activities and the conciliation of disputes involving
CSCE member states; and create a CSCE parliamentary body, the
Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary
assembly of the Council of Europe. 152 However, even with this
enhanced role, the French along with the U.S. and other Western
allies successfully turned aside the suggestion from some East
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European nations that the organization replace the NATO alliance and
the nearly defunct Warsaw Pact as Europe's main military security
structure. 153
The French share the position that although it has been
agreed to grant the CSCE increased authority and powers, it will still
be too weak to guarantee a meaningful American political and
military presence on the continent besides having few institutional
safeguards that could play an effective role in prospective crises.
Hence, the CSCE remains inadequate to provide a sufficient basis to
radically alter the Western alliance system.
3. The European Community
In the current flux in international relations, many
French officials are championing the idea that the European
Community should transform itself from a purely economic and
trading organization into a political and later a security entity with a
common defense policy. Indeed, France has been one of the major
proponents behind the campaign for an EC political role. Yet a
political or security role for the EC is inconsistent with the French
necessity to maintain national decision-making autonomy. Indicative
of this inconsistency, President Mitterrand, who views the EC as a
means of "binding in" Europe's economic, military and political links,
stops short of promoting the EC as a security organization which
would usurp more than a little of his nation's sovereignty.
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The renewed emphasis on continuing political cohesion in
the EC occurred when the prospect of German reunification became a
reality. In order for the EC to assume the responsibilities of a
collective security organization, a political union would have to occur
whereby the members contribute to a common European stance
towards security matters on the continent and abroad. While the
ultimate institutional structure of this European political union is
uncertain, it would by necessity include most of the traditional
responsibilities of a nation-state, with responsibility for external
security and stability being among the most important. 154
If one adheres to the above conclusion, the recent crisis
in the Gulf has brought to the forefront the obvious difficulties that
lie ahead in forging a common European political stance. Europe's
divided response to the war in the Gulf has led many who prior to
the crisis believed political union could be achieved in a matter of
years, to now believe unity will only occur after decades.
Supporters of European unity were critical of the EC's
disregard of the crisis after the Iraqi President ignored the 12
nations' eleventh hour attempt to avert war by final diplomatic
measures. After Hussein's refusal to comply with the 15 January UN
deadline to withdraw his troops from Kuwait, Britain, France and
Germany pursued independent, and often divergent, policies in the
region. These independent moves by EC members led the current EC
president, Jacques Poos, Luxembourg's foreign minister to state that
the war has demonstrated "the political insignificance of Europe," and
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the Belgian foreign minister to concede that "Europe is an economic
giant, a political dwarf and a military worm." 155
Since the beginning of the crisis, Britain's 35,000 troops
in the gulf were closely aligned with troops from the U.S. lending
further credence to the special relationship that has long existed
between the two countries. The French pursued independent
diplomatic measures for a while, irritating Britain and the U.S. 156
When the Iraqi President spurned French peace proposals as well,
Mitterrand too placed the French troops under the command of U.S.
forces.
The German response to the crisis, however, was the most
surprising. Political analysts are now claiming that Bonn, in
displaying a clear determination to sit out the Gulf War with the least
possible involvement, has raised strong doubts about whether it can
muster the political resolve to play the major role in European
security that its position as Europe's prime economic power would
seem to dictate. 157 One Dutch analyst claimed: "Only months ago
Europe was worried that a newly reunified Germany would dominate
the continent - now the European fear is that Germany is not reliable
in a crisis." 158 Perhaps the most stinging criticism, though, came
from the Turkish president, Turgut Ozal, who was angered by
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Germany's hesistation over whether to join NATO in militarily
defending Turkey against a potential Iraqi attack. "I think," he said,
"Germany has become so rich that it has completely lost its fighting
spirit." 1^
Some have explained the divergent responses across
Europe as simply distinct and varied public opinion tied closely to
historical phenomenon: British and French citizens expect
international roles for their countries, whereas German and also
Spanish citizens reflect strong veins of anti-interventionist
sentiment. 160 A recent poll in Germany suggests many Germans are
opposed to an international role for their country, while the country
they most admired as a model for Germany was rich and neutral
Switzerland. 161
In spite of such polls and recent German passivity to the
crisis in the Gulf, German policy makers insist that Germany will
remain bound to European institutions. Indicative of this was the
recent launching of a new plan for a common security policy by the
foreign ministers of France and Germany. The plan calls for a
"progressive development of an organic relationship" between the EC
and the WEU which would lead, by 1996, to a decision on their
integration. 162 Until 1996, the WEU would be tasked with deciding
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and adopting common security policies under the guidance of the
European Council. The Council would decide by unanimity which
subjects were ready for adopting a common foreign policy; then
foreign ministers would decide policy in these areas by majority
vote. 163
France has long espoused the virtues of an enhanced role
for the European Council. 164 A country with a weak parliament and
strong president, it is not surprising that France would expect the
European Council to play a presidential role within the EC. France is
also pleased that the plan calls for the WEU to become NATO's
"European pillar," something else the French have long desired to
strengthen.
In spite of recent proposals concerning European
integration, the emergence of a united Europe with a defense and
security dimension is likely to continue by small steps. Coordinating
the political and military agendas of long-sovereign nations will not
come easily or quickly. Although it has been argued that the
shortcomings illustrated by Europe's reaction to the Gulf War could
give Europe precisely the shock it needed to seriously begin working
toward a joint political and security policy, the common impression
among European officials is that the war left Europe even further
divided than ever.
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Currently, the debate is ongoing as to whether the EC
should concentrate its efforts on assuming this political and security
role or concentrate on an all-European trade and monetary
arrangement. If it chose to sponsor a larger economic framework, it
could incorporate not only the remaining advanced industrial
countries of Western Europe, but also the newly forming democratic
countries of Eastern Europe currently attempting to adopt market-
type economies. In this case, the EC's charter would be limited to
facilitating internal economic interaction and protecting the economic
interests of all its members. If the EC chose to evolve into a security
organization, its membership would necessarily be restricted to the
current level for some period of time.
The French desire is that the EC maintain the momentum
of political cohesion and concentrate its energies to complete its
union. Any enlargement that could slow down the process or dilute
the political will must be postponed until the EC has definitely agreed
on its future structure. 165 However, again, the French do not see the
evolution of a political role for the EC as obviating or replacing the
role of NATO. The United States has no connection with the EC - it is,
and will remain by definition, a European institution. The French
believe that if political union is achieved, it would create a strong
European pillar in NATO, balancing American leadership as the U.S.
and its partners seek to redefine NATO's role in the new era of
East/West relations. However, the French also firmly state that any
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proposal for European unity would be a complement to NATO - NATO
must still be maintained to ensure the U.S. commitment to Europe.
4. The Western European Union
The recent proposal presented by the French and German
governments and strongly endorsed by the Italians which would
push the EC into political union called for: merging the EC with the
Western European Union or WEU; strengthening the European Council
of Ministers; and taking all foreign policy and defense decisions by
majority vote. 166 Although majority voting on all foreign and
defense issues would give France the right of veto, the French would
still be required to surrender some national sovereignty. Even
though this would be inconsistent with the French demand for
national decision-making autonomy, France reportedly was ready to
do this. 167 However, the French scheme would not merge the WEU
with the EC immediately - only in the long term would it be
gradually fused with the EC's political cooperation procedures. 168
The WEU was created as a result of the U.S. desire to have
Europeans increase their contribution to the defense of the region.
The underlying objectives were to strengthen peace and security and
promote European integration and close cooperation with other
European organizations. Simultaneously, the WEU's work has
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complemented that of the Atlantic Alliance enhancing the European
role to the benefit of Western security. 169
As the only European Parliamentary body mandated by
treaty to discuss all aspects of security including defense, the French
have actively promoted the value of the WEU. The long term goal of
the WEU is to develop a more cohesive European defense identity 170
which the French perceive as promoting the "European pillar,"
something they have continuously advocated. Until the EC and NATO
have assumed political or security roles with which the French are
satisfied, they will continue to espouse the value of the WEU as a
complement to, not a replacement of, NATO.
5. NATO
For the French, the commitment of the U.S. to the defense
of Europe remains indispensable for French security policy and the
most likely means of maintaining that commitment is through NATO.
France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966
claiming it was a U.S. -dominated framework limiting the freedom of
action of its members and inhibiting French independence. However,
after withdrawal France could continue to benefit from the U.S.
strategic nuclear "umbrella" and NATO's efforts to deter the Soviets
and neutralize German power. Indeed, the foundations of French
security policy have assumed a large U.S. nuclear and conventional
force presence in Germany, which as part of an extensive integrated
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alliance structure, provide a de facto forward glacis for France's
protection. 171
With the formal end of the Cold War and the East-West
division fading, the universal consensus concerning the future role of
NATO is that it must by necessity evolve from a strictly security
alliance to one tending toward political orientation. French views on
how NATO should be reoriented are generally vague but center on a
much looser framework, dominated by the Europeans, with a
leadership role for France and with a continuing and important
supporting role for the U.S.
Given the expectation of large-scale withdrawals of U.S.
troops and weapons from Europe, strong speculation has arisen as to
whether the French would be willing to return to NATO's integrated
military structure or be more receptive to basing U.S. or other
foreign forces on French soil. This argument could even be more
strongly advanced for the case of a German government adopting an
anti-nuclear stance and expelling all foreign forces and weapons or
an assumption of power in the Soviet Union by the military
leadership or some other authoritative, repressive element. Yet,
France continues to refuse any suggestion of returning to NATO's
integrated military structure or of allowing foreign forces on its soil.
"Please," said President Mitterrand recently, "let us have no more
speculation on this subject." 172 However, French officials say behind
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closed doors that France would be ready to integrate fully into a
NATO that had a European commander, rather than an American
one. 173
The French cite conflicting strategic conceptions between
them and the Alliance as another inhibitor to their return to NATO.
One reason cited for France's withdrawal from NATO was de Gaulle's
disagreement with the U.S. doctrine of flexible response. He believed
that the U.S. would in all probability postpone any nuclear
employment until Europe had been devastated by conventional
warfare, when an earlier use of nuclear weapons may have
prevented war altogether. With NATO's recent endorsement of the
use of nuclear weapons as a last resort, the French criticisms have
remained unchanged: deterrence, they contend, is intended to
prevent wars and not win them.
Although France acknowledges the strategic necessity of
the maintenance of a U.S. military presence in Europe and NATO as
the most probable institution for ensuring this presence, French
actions are making their own desires increasingly difficult. The
French instinctively recoil from altering any national policies which
would make it easier for American forces to remain in Europe in
adequate strength. Acknowledged one senior U.S. diplomat, "We are
having a dialogue of the deaf with the French: we are urging
consequential thought on them, and saying they can't have it both
ways." 174
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Another area the French refuse to support which in turn
could have the effect of undermining Alliance continuity is the idea
of multi-national corps for NATO. The Alliance's July 1990 decision
to reshape the army corps along multi-national lines made up of
national units was viewed by most allies as making a continued
foreign military presence more palatable to host nations, and
particularly, to the German public. However, the French saw the
initiative as operationally problematic and politically undesirable.
They believe such a structure would deepen integration under U.S.
authority, postponing a necessary and long overdue adjustment of
European/American leadership responsibilities. 175
However, the French have also not been particularly
supportive of the idea of a specifically West European defense
force. 176 This new scheme of a European army under EC auspices
could again have the effect of usurping French autonomy of decision.
Overall, rather than supporting vehicles which would be of utility in
advancing their own political goals, the French instead are continuing
to spout the Gaullist rhetoric of the ultimate French duty to uphold
its rank.
6. The Franco-German Axis
The ultimate vision for French security policy is a
stronger, more autonomous West European defense posture centered
around close Franco-German relations and a diminished European
175 Yost, "France and the New Europe," 119.
176
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dependence on the U.S. Key to this scenario are strong common
policies, governing economics and politics, with Germany.
Since the revival in 1963 of the defense clauses of the
Franco-German friendship treaty, known as the Elysee Treaty, the
two countries have strengthened their military ties establishing joint
defense committees and even forming an unprecedented 5,000-man
joint brigade. Their special relationship is one of a carefully fostered
and constantly nurtured partnership, and one that remains sensitive
and fragile.
However, relations between Kohl and Mitterrand - never
as close as those between De Gaulle and Adenauer - have come under
increasing strain over the past year. The Germans are irritated over
Mitterrand's December 1989 rush to visit newly-liberated East Berlin
appearing to lend staying power to the East German state; his
apparent attempt to renew the French-Soviet alliance against
Germany, specifically against German reunification; his public
insistence on numerous conditions for German reunification including
German guarantees for the Polish frontier; and his decision to
withdraw nearly all of the 50,000 French troops from German soil by
1995 despite clear signals that Mr. Kohl would prefer most to
remain. 177
The French have also been annoyed with the Germans
over a series of incidents: Kohl's sudden announcement of his 10-
177 Among numerous sources on this subject see: "A relationship in the balance," The Economist . 6
October 1990, 54; and Yost, "France and the New Europe," 112. For the French pull-out from Germany
see, JAC Lewis, "France to begin force pull-out," Jane's Defence Weekly . 1 September 1990, 301; JAC
Lewis, "France moves on German pull-out," Jane's Defence Weekly . 24 November 1990, 1011.
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point plan for German unity without prior consultation with his
allies; his hesitation over the Polish frontier; his push for German
economic unity without concern for the EC's monetary union; and his
direct dealings with Gorbachev during their July 1990 summit. 178
In spite of this recent strain which could lead to
somewhat less friendly bilateral relations than those of recent years,
the Paris/Bonn axis will most likely continue to be the driving force
behind European integration. France will remain profoundly
interested in having a common policy with Germany and will
continue to place a high priority on its bilateral relations with the
Germans.
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V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FRANCE'S ROLE
IN THE GULF CRISIS
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the events
that occurred since then have destroyed France's claim to have a
special relationship with the Arab world in general, and Iraq in
particular. France's daily tactical oscillations over the course of the
crisis, including the final hours which preceded the allied air attack
on Iraq, provided telling signs of a nation deeply mired in a strategic
quandary. The fluidity of the situation in the Gulf since 2 August,
indeed the fluidity of the emerging international system as a whole,
have raised the necessity of tightening links between France and the
United States. However, although an identity of interests between
the two states seems to be emerging both in the Gulf and beyond,
France's "Atlantic option" is not a choice that will be readily accepted
in a society still mesmerized by the Gaullist ideals of nationalism and
independence.
President Mitterrand's strong support of U.S. policy in
Operation Desert Storm does, however, have historical precedent.
Although an un-swerving nationalist, President De Gaulle stood by
President John F. Kennedy during the 1961 Bay of Pigs crisis in Cuba,
indicating in that instance, at least, that he was more anti-Communist
than anti-American. In 1980, Mitterrand expressed sympathy for
President Jimmy Carter's unsuccessful attempt to free the U.S.
hostages being held in Teheran. Mitterrand later sided, in 1982, with
Britain during the Falklands War against Argentina which France had
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previously equipped with Exocet missiles. In both cases, Mitterrand
defied the left-wing of his Socialist Party who preferred to support
the Third World countries. 179
Mitterrand's decision to send a military force to the Gulf was
not simple or automatic. At the end of the 1960's, De Gaulle set his
Middle East policy on a pro-Arab course and it has been adhered to
by all successive presidents. Between 1974 and 1988, France and
Iraq signed 20 agreements of military cooperation and nine security
agreements. 180 President Giscard d'Estaing's administration even
went so far as to sell a nuclear plant to Iraq (allegedly for civilian
purposes) however, the plant was promptly destroyed by the
Israelis. Although Mitterrand's first government considered the sale
of a second plant to Baghdad, the idea was later dropped due to
internal and external governmental pressure.
However, the close ties between Iraq and France did lead to
France becoming one of Iraq's major suppliers of arms - second only
to the Soviet Union. During the past ten to 15 years, France provided
Iraq with a formidable arsenal of sophisticated weapons, worth
billions of dollars, to assist Baghdad's secular, socialist government in
its war against Iran's Islamic fundamentalist rulers. 181 French firms
delivered more than 100 Mirage Fl fighter jets, 600 Exocet antiship
missiles, 1,000 Roland surface-to-air missiles and 6,000 Hot and
Milan antitank missiles to Iraq since Mitterrand was elected
179 Janice Valls-Russell, "Mitterrand Takes a Strong Stand," The New Leader . 3 September 1990, 7.
180 ibid., 8.
181 William Drozdiak, "France Denounces Iraq's Offer," The Washington Post. 24 August 1990, A31.
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President in 1981. 182 Although some have severely criticized the
French role in building Iraq's arsenal as an inappropriate policy of
"shoveling weapons to Iraq," 183 Mitterrand has supported France's
role as one he does not regret. To him the alternative would have
meant Iran's Islamic fundamentalist revolution could have swept
through the entire Arab world. "At that time, the historical situation
required us" to arm Iraq, Mitterrand has claimed. 184
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait eventually forced France to
reassess its Middle East policy. The French terminated arms sales
and credits to Iraq (France had temporarily suspended all arms
deliveries to Iraq in 1989 due to a debt repayment dispute);
embraced the trade embargo; and in a political rather than military
move, sent the carrier Clemenceau (carrying helicopters) to the Gulf.
However, throughout the initial period of the crisis, the French
continued, in Gaullist fashion, their pretensions of international
autonomy. In one U.S. critic's words the French response was "a
mixture of muddled policy, trying to have it both ways, ingrained
cynicism, Gaullist-style posturing and domestic politics." 185
President Mitterrand initially raised strong objections to the
U.S. calls for an economic embargo of Iraq and Kuwait. Ostensibly to
182 William Drozdiak, "France Sends Independent Naval Force; Britain Joins U.S. Plane, Ship Building,"
The Washington Post 10 August 1990, A26.
183 Flora Lewis, "Mitterrand's Cynical Gaullist Posturing," The New York Times . 16 January 1991, A19.
184 William Drozdiak, "France Sends 4,000 More Troops, To Seek an Air Blockade of Iraq," The
Washington Post . 16 September 1990, A38.
185 Lewis, "Mitterrand's Posturing," A 19.
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avoid raising the specter of a Western crusade against the Arab
world, Mitterrand also in early August expanded the French naval
force in the Gulf and sent ground units and advisors to Saudi Arabia
but vowed that they would not join the multinational defense
command assembled under U.S. leadership. Any eventual military
action, he stressed, would be carried out "in cooperation and
coordination" with the United States "but only under French
officers." 186 Mitterrand also stated that he wished to allow every
opportunity for the conflict "to be resolved by the Arab community,"
however, "if that proves impossible, France will assume its own
responsibilities." 187
This less than firm position taken by President Mitterrand was
criticized by many as a French attempt to win special treatment from
the Iraqi government. When it was discovered that French citizens
in Baghdad and Kuwait had been moved by Iraqi authorities to
potential target areas to shield Iraq from attack by Western forces
and France responded by ordering its fleet to use force to ensure
compliance with the U.N. embargo, Iraq did indeed offer a privileged
deal to the French. Iraq offered to free some of the French citizens
as a sign of trust in the bilateral relationship and in the hope that
France would withdraw the forces it had sent to the Gulf to enforce
the U.N. sanctions.
However, the French government spurned the offer as an Iraqi
attempt to undermine Western unity and to lure one of its most
186 Drozdiak, "France Sends Independent," A26.
187 ibid.
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important trading partners into breaking ranks with the U.N.
mandated sanctions. In fact the offer induced France to "reaffirm its
full solidarity" with all the countries whose nationals were being held
by Iraqi authorities. 188 France's shift in position to one more closely
aligned with that of the U.S. came after Mitterrand publicly
denounced Saddam Hussein's unwillingness to pursue plausible
diplomatic solutions to the crisis and his clear intention to hold
foreigners to thwart any military attack.
Mitterrand's shift to support of the American position was not
welcomed by all members of the French government, however. Well
known for his pro-Arab sympathies, former French Foreign Minister
Claude Cheysson, who was chosen to interface with the PLO in Tunis,
made no secret of the fact that he had asked PLO leader Yasser
Arafat to intercede on behalf of French nationals captive in Iraq and
Kuwait. 189 While condemning the invasion of Kuwait, Cheysson's
remarks about Saddam Hussein were a blend of appeasement and
admiration. Of much greater significance, the defense minister at
that time, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, who had previously proclaimed
that enforcing the embargo through a blockade would be an act of
war, became an outspoken critic of the shift in French policy and the
previously alluded to political division within the government
became internationally apparent.
188 Drozdiak, "France Denounces," A29. Also see William Drozdiak, "Use of Force Authorized By
France," The Washington Post. 20 August 1990, A 15.
189 Stuart Wavell, "Breaking up is hard to do as Paris ends 20 year love affair with Baghdad," The Sunday
Times
. 26 August 1990, l/10a.
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Chevenement, who was already under intense government
scrutiny over disagreements concerning the defense budget and
European unity, had refused to leave his vacation retreat in Tuscany
to assume his cabinet responsibilities during the crisis and even
disassociated himself from France's military actions. "They don't
need me to carry out Bush's policies: I'm going back to Tuscany," he
announced, and did. 190 Chevenement was so anguished by the
prospect of war in the Gulf that on 21 August 1990 he issued an
anonymous communique questioning France's position. Although he
was reportedly reprimanded by President Mitterrand and Prime
Minister Rocard, Chevenement continued to insist that "should there
be a war and should we take part, it must be France's war: France
must remain mistress of her commitments." 191 Chevenement is also
widely known as one of the founding members of the Franco-Iraqi
Friendship Society.
Not surprisingly then, Chevenement was uncharacteristically
silent when on 14 September 1990, Iraqi soldiers violated
international law by forcing their way into the French ambassador's
residence in Kuwait and taking away three French citizens
presumably to join other Western hostages located at the potential
military target areas. Mitterrand responded by sending 4,000 more
ground troops backed by tanks and combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia
and initiating a proposal to the U.N. to extend the land and sea
blockade to cover air traffic. This move had the effect of pushing
19° ibid.
191 Valls-Russell, "Mitterrand Takes," 8.
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France's military engagement beyond embargo enforcement to a
potentially offensive footing (by the end of September France had
13,000 troops in the Gulf region) and more closely aligning the
French and U.S. positions. 192 Yet even though the French ground
forces were to coordinate closely with the multinational force of
American and Arab troops, Mitterrand continued to insist that France
retain its independent military command.
Mitterrand's next instance of sending conflicting signals to Iraq
came in late September in a speech delivered to the United Nations
General Assembly in New York. While claiming that "France is acting
in close agreement with its 12 partners of the European Community
and with those of the Western European Union, in close coordination
with the military forces of the United States, of the Arab countries
and of others which have been dispatched to the Middle East for the
same purposes," Mitterrand then specifically linked the Palestinian
issue to the crisis claiming that if Iraq declares "its intention to
withdraw its forces, to free the hostages, everything becomes
possible." 193 When Iraq announced later that it would release the
327 French hostages in "appreciation of the free French people's
rejection of Bush's aggressive means and the use of arms against
Iraq," 194 French diplomats acknowledged that Mitterrand's speech
192 Howard LaFranchi, "France Toughens Stance on Gulf," Christian Science Monitor . 17 September
1990, 3.
193 Francois Mitterrand, "The Rule of Law: Kuwait and Iraq," as cited in Vital Speeches Of The Dav . Vol
LVII, No! 1, 15 October 1990, 6.
194
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may have encouraged Iraq's latest overtures to France. 195
Furthermore, Mitterrand, on other occasions was becoming
increasingly insistent that the U.N. not have a double standard in its
handling of the Middle East and continued to link old conflicts with
the current crisis. The French government's position became one of
pressing for tougher U.N. action on the killing of Palestinians by
Israeli policemen in the occupied territories and the fate of Lebanon.
Hence, Mitterrand's eleventh hour solo attempt at one final
diplomatic resolution to the crisis came as no apparent surprise.
Mitterrand relayed to Iraq that his foreign minister, Roland Dumas,
would stand ready to fly to Baghdad at any time up to the UN
deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal, in a final attempt to avert conflict.
However, President Hussein never responded to the French proposal
which, typical of French diplomacy, was sent to him without the
knowledge of any of France's allies. This last uncoordinated,
independent action by Mitterrand drew a cautious, if not
disapproving, reaction from the U.S. and British governments. The
allied policy-makers feared that the move by France would be taken
as criticism of U.S. conduct, even if not intended as such, and that the
Iraqi president would again perceive the initiative as evidence of
disunity in the coalition.
Mitterrand's efforts at a last-minute compromise, an apparent
attempt to address growing anti-war sentiment in France, helped to
assure overwhelming French parliamentary support for the military
195 Howard LaFranchi, "Iraq Woos France With Hostage Release," Christian Science Monitor. 13 October
1990, 3.
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alternative that was approved 16 January in the National Assembly
by a vote of 523 to 43 (with two abstentions) and the Senate (219 to
25). 196 Mitterrand's hard line speech to the Parliament and the
resulting vote erased lingering doubts about France's commitment to
the allied effort in the Gulf, doubts that had been rekindled by the
latest French peace initiative. This move was followed by the
uncertain but long-awaited announcement that France would place
its 10,000 troops under U.S. command for "pre-determined missions"
to liberate Kuwait. The move represented an extraordinary show of
solidarity by a country whose military doctrine holds that only the
president is empowered to send forces into war and that French
soldiers can take their orders only from French officers in the
national chain of command. 197
Although Mitterrand declared that it was "inconceivable" that
France would not join the U.S., Britain and other international
coalition members in forcibly terminating Iraq's occupation, the
status of the 10,000 French troops and 76 combat aircraft in Saudi
Arabia had remained ambiguous because France had insisted on
maintaining an independent military command ever since De Gaulle
removed the country from NATO's integrated military structure in
1966. However, there was ambivalence among U.S., British and even
many French officials over the content of the accord which was
196 Alan Riding, "France Puts Its Gulf Force Under U.S. Command," The New York Times . 17 January
1991, A10.
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finally concluded at 8pm on Wednesday, 16 January, only hours
before the first attack on Iraq. Although the accord placed French
forces under U.S. command, the Franco-American protocol agreement
promoted by the defense minister, Chevenement, effectively barred
French planes and troops from entering Iraqi territory. 198 Many
French felt that a conditional engagement limited to Kuwaiti territory
was ineffective and unacceptable, threatening France's role in
deciding the new world order which would follow victory.
After three days of contradictory statements by Chevenement
and Mitterrand, the French President clarified the country's military
and political objectives in the war by claiming that Iraq's "military-
industrial potential" must be destroyed and that the French were
indeed prepared to carry out attacks inside Iraqi territory. 199
Mitterrand's statement, not insignificantly, followed a dramatic
shift in French public opinion in favor of strong French participation
in the war. Several polls conducted immediately prior to
Mitterrand's clarification, indicated more than two-thirds of the
French supported a strong French presence alongside the U.S. and
British. 200 In the final days prior to the expiration of the UN
deadline for Iraq's withdrawal, polls indicated more than half were
198 Stuart Wavell, "'Half-hearted' Mitterrand takes the flak," The Sunday Times . 20 January 1991, 1.2.
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against the war. 201 One author further noted that Mitterrand
authorized French forces to hit targets in Iraq as well as occupied
Kuwait only after his most important political rival, former president
Valery Giscard d'Estaing claimed that a policy of bombing only
Kuwait was equivalent to a World War Two decision by the Allies to
bomb occupied France and spare Germany. 202
Whatever prompted Mitterrand to override Chevenement and
declare France's willingness to bomb Iraq, the result was
Chevenement's resignation. Under attack for his dovish position on
the Iraqi crisis since the day of the Kuwaiti invasion, Chevenement
had been accused of undermining the morale of French forces in the
Gulf by publicly questioning France's participation in the war and
claiming that allied objectives in the Persian Gulf risked going
beyond those established by the UN. 203 Chevenement had
repeatedly called for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, claiming that
a war would cause over 100,000 deaths and would permanently
alienate France from its traditional ties to the Arab world. He was
adamant that France's long-term interests lay in forging closer ties
with the Arab world, particularly those countries on the southern
Mediterranean shore, rather than in building a federal Europe which
201 Howard LaFranchi and Francine S. Kiefer, "Antiwar Sentiment Gains Ground in France and Germany,'
Christian Science Monitor . 18 January 1991, 6.
202 Jim Hoagland, "Germany: Timidity in a Time of Crisis," Washington Post National Weekly Edition .
4-10 February 1991,28.
203 Alan Riding, "French Defense Chief Quits, Opposing Allied War Goals," The New York Times . 30
January 1991, A7.
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he believed would become quickly dominated by the Americans. 204
Chevenement was replaced by Pierre Joxe, the Interior Minister and
a loyal colleague of President Mitterrand, which ended the ambiguity
created by the government's divided Gulf strategy.
Throughout the air campaign and the 100 hours of the ground
offensive against Iraq, the French fully participated in and continued
to express the cohesion of the anti-Iraq coalition. French troops were
involved in the ground war immediately upon launching the first
attacks and French combat planes continued to strike targets inside
and outside Iraq. However, having stood firmly alongside the U.S.
during the war, now that the war is over, French differences with
Washington over how to win the peace may reemerge.
The French feel confident that their participation in the war
has earned them important seats at all future negotiating tables. In
the last days before the allied air attacks commenced, President
Mitterrand and Prime Minister Rocard emphasized their commitment
to an international peace conference on the Middle East and claimed
that countries involved in action against Iraq would be morally
bound to help settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian
problem. 205 After the allied victory, Mitterrand again signalled
France's intention to play an active and independent role stating, "We
204
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will spell out the objectives that we consider just, and no one will
give us orders." 206
The French claim their interests are founded on an acute
awareness that Europe's, and particularly their own, historical,
cultural and geographical links to the Arab world make their
interests different from those of the United States; France wants to
ensure the U.S. is not alone in determining the future of the Middle
East region. The French perceive the situation in the region as a time
bomb of Arab economic underdevelopment and political
frustration. 207 Hence, the reason behind the French initially
signaling for an immediate international peace conference to tackle
the Arab/Israeli crisis and other imminent problems in the
aftermath of the war, including a development program to rebuild
Iraq.
Then, unexpectedly, France abruptly signaled its desire to work
closely with the U.S. in trying to settle the Palestinian and
Arab/Israeli problems and announced that France no longer
considered an international peace conference on the Middle East
essential. 208 Conflicting views remain on other smaller issues,
however, and confirm the fact that a common approach to all the
region's problems has still not been achieved.
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The change in approach signifies that the French government,
albeit some remaining assertions of a "different" course to peace in
the region, realizes that its future lies in binding itself tightly to its
European partners in economic, diplomatic and military affairs.
Equally important, the French also realize that their future lies in
redefining and improving relations with the U.S., which as the




One author aptly hypothesized that, "from Napoleon III to
Mitterrand via de Gaulle, French policy can be interpreted as an
attempt to resurrect past grandeur in the absence of the means that
had once made it possible." 209 France, like Britain, is a medium-sized
power whose military defenses and economy are not large enough to
stand alone. Even withdrawn from NATO's integrated military
structure, France continues to enjoy U.S. nuclear guarantees to
Western Europe. Indeed, as previously discussed, France's own
independent national security policy is dependent on those
guarantees. However, with the reunification of Germany, uncertainty
over the future structure of NATO and the type of U.S. commitment
to Europe, compounded by diminishing defense expenditures, it
appears France may finally need to dispense with the Gaullist
rhetoric and relinquish its increasingly unsustainable global strategy.
Mitterrand, while continuing to affirm defense independence,
has moved France closer to NATO and the United States. As concerns
about the danger of Germany drifting away from NATO toward
neutralism mount, France will push harder for the German state to
be anchored firmly in NATO and Europe, and will itself probably
move even closer to the U.S. and NATO.
Yet to date, the dramatic events of recent years have not led to
a reversal of fundamental Gaullist defense positions. Enhanced
209 Hassner, "The View from Paris," 191.
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cooperation with the United States has not meant France is now
ready to return to NATO's integrated military command. Likewise,
enlarged sanctuary has not meant joint decision making -
cooperation and consultation have meant exactly that.
Although Mitterrand himself appears to be opening his mind to
the Atlanticist viewpoint, he has been politically constrained to
keeping his defense policy in line with the Gaullist traditions,
particularly the tradition of an independent security policy. Yet with
the reality of German reunification and accelerated French efforts to
moor Germany to Europe via the EC, it has become increasingly
obvious that Mitterrand will eventually be forced to choose between
his ingrained fears of supranational institutions and his growing
fears of German resurgence. With a series of joint declarations by
Kohl and Mitterrand advocating European political and security
union, it appears Mitterrand may be slowly moving France toward
inclusion in a "Federal Europe."
However, at the same time, the political sensitivity and
ambiguity of the current state of international affairs has led
numerous French officials, including on occasion Mitterrand himself,
to construe that De Gaulle's beliefs are justified now more than ever:
in this period of uncertainty, France must maintain its own defense
capability. Those who adhere to this line argue further that there
now exists the possibility that NATO could abandon its concept of
nuclear deterrence for conventional defense. This would be in total
conflict with the fundamental premise of French defense policy:
deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation.
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The recent Gulf war has only reinforced the idea that
conventional defense is more applicable today than nuclear
deterrence. France's participation in the war and its desire to work
closely with the United States has led to a remarkable improvement
in relations between the two nations. This warming of relations has
apparently even survived in the wake of the war with France
signaling its desire to forego any "different" policy to which it had
previously alluded, and to instead maintain an approach to the
Middle East conflict similar to that of the U.S.
Yet this French warming to American policy choices cannot be
said to have resolved French ambivalence: France's Gulf policy was
resolved in favor of the Allies as a matter of practicality rather than
any assured long-term ideological commitment to U.S. policy goals.
Ironically, where under strict Gaullist traditions, French policy
choices were previously fairly predictable; now they appear to be
totally unpredictable. Although changes in policy are undoubtedly
occurring, French security choices remain as before - elusive.
In the final analysis, French security policy remains at a
crossroads: the choice is one of pursuing the present course of
stressing France's special status based on her traditional nuclear
deterrence policy, or firmly acknowledging that the road to enhanced
security is through greater cooperation with her NATO and other
European allies. What is apparent to date is that although the French
purport to espouse the second choice of deeper cooperation through
extended bilateral and multilateral cooperation efforts, their actions
continue to encourage the now unsatisfactory status quo
arrangement. France remains unwilling to return to the NATO
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integrated military command and French defense policies continue to
be largely national and independent.
The French are in agreement with the Allied consensus that a
pan-European structure, such as the CSCE, is largely inadequate to
assume the security functions currently performed by NATO. They
also believe that argument holds trus for the WEU, the EC, or any
other existing bilateral or multilateral security arrangement because
unlike NATO, they cannot guarantee the U.S. commitment to Europe.
Given that the French acknowledge the value, indeed the
necessity, of NATO for their national security, the over-riding
question becomes why do French officials continue to undermine, or
at least refuse to participate in, efforts to maintain NATO's
legitimacy? The only apparent answer to this question is that it is
easier for the French to maintain the comfortable and successful
status quo, which allows them to claim autonomy of decision and a
special status in the world, than to make the painful adjustment
inherent in recognition of the current international circumstances.
Yet by failing to recognize the need to abandon the Gaullist rhetoric
of independence and a privileged world rank, France may miss the
opportunity to play a leading role in constructing a new European
security order.
Failing to adapt to changing international circumstances and
recognize the increasing unsustainability of French independent
national security policies, may lead to France's isolation and her
subsequent adoption of more nationalistic policies. Some authorities
have asserted that a similar reaction could occur if certain
supranational elements of the EC's political union, or even perceived
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German domination of the current EC structure, seem to threaten
France's national identity and decision-making autonomy. 210 A
logical corollary to this argument would be French nuclear-armed
neutrality and greater German military, political and economic power
in the center of Europe.
The acclaimed French ideal security arrangement of a stronger,
more autonomous West European defense posture, centered around
close Franco-German relations and a diminished European
dependence on the U.S., is the correct approach for France. Now, the
words need to be manifested in action: strengthened support for the
CSCE in its unique role of bringing together nearly all European states
under one forum; renewed support for the WEU as the only European
body mandated by treaty to discuss security issues and a likely
foundation for developing an autonomous West European defense
posture; maintain the momentum of economic and monetary union in
the EC - concentration of effort should be focused on trade, with
political cohesion being relegated a secondary goal; and increased
emphasis on developing more extensive Franco-German relations as
this relationship may be the one that matters the most in
determining Europe's future. In the long term, this should effect a
stronger, more cohesive European defense posture or "European
pillar" to complement and reinforce the foundations and institutions
of NATO. A stronger commitment by the European NATO nations
would also have the effect of reducing the U.S. share of the Alliance
burden and Europe's dependence on the U.S. (something the U.S.
2 '0 For a discussion of these possibilities see, Yost, "France and the New Europe," 123-125.
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strongly desires as well) while still maintaining the vital U.S.
commitment that only NATO can guarantee.
The French attachment to the Atlantic Alliance as the
framework necessary for keeping the U.S. engaged in Europe needs
to be translated into greater participation in the Alliance as a whole.
France should resume her seat on the NATO Planning Committee and
upon NATO's adoption of a more political role for the Alliance, begin
to play a much greater role in the Alliance initiatives. Moreover,
France should offer NATO, as it did Germany, consultation on the use
of French tactical nuclear weapons during war time if the battlefield
situation allows it, and also consultation on the use of nuclear
weapons should be arranged during peace time.
Further bilateral and multilateral cooperation efforts in the
nuclear, logistic and reinforcement areas would free money for the
strengthening of conventional military forces - something which the
recent Gulf war has proven is becoming increasingly necessary. A
related issue is a need for re-examination of France's nuclear
doctrine and a revised policy which would rely less on a nuclear
response to threats and more on a conventional one.
As a leading European nation, France could play a major role in
reshaping Europe in accordance with its own national security
objectives. De Gaulle's ideals fostered a strong impression of French
independence and rank, and enabled France to restore its pride and
prestige after World War Two. However, the Gaullist myth of French
grandeur and independence as a great world power can no longer be
sustained. The advantage of increased security through a
strengthening of ties with NATO, Western and even non-Western
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institutions, must come at the cost of a less independent role. A
contributor to much of the current state of European affairs, France
remains essential in constructing any European security order and
therefore can still play a leading role, although the role may have to
be shared equally with Britain and, more likely, Germany. De
Gaulle's struggle for independence may have been his most visible
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